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LOOKING AT liHAT WE WOULD SAY: CRITICS AND DEFENDERS
"Of course we would not say that, but I want to know 
whether it is trueI" So goes a complaint against a style 
of philosophizing, against the appeal to what we would say.^ 
With this complaint, philosophers lay a challenge to so- 
called ordinary-language philosophy, a challenge to "show 
us the relevance of looking at what we would say." Bertrand 
Russell, for example, delivers a sweeping rejection of philo­
sophizing by looking at what we would say:
(Ordinary language philosophy) seems to concern itself 
not with the world and our relation to it, but only 
with the different ways in which silly people can say 
silly things. If this is all that philosophy has to 
offer, I cannot think that it is a worthy subject of 
study.2
I use the word "would" neutrally, that is, not meaning 
to beg the question whether it is the appeal to what we would 
say, or, perhaps, to what we could say. In Chapter Three I 
will address the significance of this distinction.
^Bertrand Russell, My Philosophical Development (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1959), page 230.
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Other, more recent philosophers echo Russell's challenge.
Alan R. White, as an example, speaks not of the world but 
of what is true, and cautions that it can be a misrake to 
confuse "what it is true to say with what it is proper to 
say"; he warns of a confusion between "the impropriety of 
saying certain things and the possible truth of such things."^
In a section appropriately entitled "Seeing and Saying We 
See," Fred I, Dretske cautions that a failure "to distin­
guish between what one sees . . .  and the things we are
4prepared to say we see. . . can lead to confusion." John
R. Searle, unlike Dretske and White, not only cautions against
but attacks looking at what we would say; he even diagnoses
what he calls a fundamental mistake;
(It is a mistake to suppose) that the conditions in 
which it is correct to assert that p are identical with 
the conditions in which it is the case that p. (In fact) 
there is no reason at all to suppose that these are 
identical, since assertion is only one kind of speech 
act among many.^
As if to anticipate these recent cautions and attacks, G. E.
Moore, in a 1949 letter to Norman Malcolm, lectures Malcolm
on the difference between the impropriety or senselessness of
an expression and the possible truth of that expression:
It is perfectly possible that a person who uses (words)
^Alan R. White, Modal Thinking (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1975), pages 50 and 172.
^Fred I. Dretske, Seeing and Knowing (London; Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1969), page 37.
^John R. Searle, "Assertions and Aberrations," Symposium
on J. L. Austin (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969),
page 218 (emphasis mine) .
senselessly should be using them (in a way such that) 
what he asserts by so using them should be true.®
Moore, then, like Searle, Dretske, White, and Russell, thought
that though it may be odd to say something, what was odd
might very well be true.
Such an attack captures the heart of many misgivings
about so-called ordinary-language philosophy. More than once a
meticulous appeal to what we would say has been met by the
(restrained) response "So what1" as if to object, "All right,
I see that it is a queer thing to say, but I want to know
whether it is trueI" Listen to Alan R. White as he invokes
this "queer but true" objection in an attempt to forestall
appealing to what we would say :
(The sentence) "I believe that (Sam robbed the store), 
but he did not," though a queer thing to say, is perfectly 
capable of being quite true.̂
Sensing the queerness of saying "I believe that Sam robbed the 
store, but he did not," and anticipating the implication that 
since the sentence is queer it is not true. White tries to 
outmaneuver his imagined opposition simply by asserting that 
even though the sentence is queer, it still might be true.
As we shall see, such maneuvers are typical of the attempts 
of many philosophers either to bypass or to attack ordinary 
language philosophy. The status of ordinary-language philo­
sophy is at stake. Inviting as it does the "So what?" response,
^Norman Malcolm, Thought and Knowledge (Cornell University 
Press, 177), page 174.
^White, Modal Thinking, page 51 (emphasis mine).
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ordinaxy-language philosophy must confront the objection that 
encapsulates that response, the "gueer-but-true" objection.
But there is more than one "gueer-but-true" objection. 
First, a philosopher might object to ruling out an expression 
(to the claim that "we would not say that"); second, a philo­
sopher might object to ruling ^  an expression (to the claim 
that "we would say this"); and within each of these two ob­
jections a philosopher might distinguish further between 
challenging what we would (not) say, or challenging what we 
could (not) say. My goal is to classify and explain the many 
"gueer-but-true" objections, and to argue that none of them
is completely defensible. I hope also to show that though
not completely defensible, the objections are natural and (as 
I shall argue) welcome moves in the process of treating a 
philosophical problem. Let me try now to explain the "gueer- 
but-true" objections, by seeing what they are against, namely, 
the appeal to what we would say.
The Appeal to What We Would Say 
This misunderstood terrain needs some landmarks, some
examples, of which the locus classicus is, surely, paragraph
246 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations :
It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke)
that I know that I am in pain . . .
Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations 
only from my behavior,— for I cannot be said to learn 
of them. I have them.
The truth isl it makes sense to say about other people
that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself.8
Judging from the number of commentators on this passage,
Wittgenstein must have struck a nerve. For some, paragraph
246 looks like an easy target— it is so simple; but for
others, it provides the standard for a careful philosophy—
it is so deft. To see Wittgenstein's deft stroke, recall
the process of treatment in paragraph 246. To begin the
treatment, Wittgenstein opens the paragraph by wondering
aloud "In what way are my sensations private?" He then
imagines what I shall call a Cartesian reply, "Well, only
I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can
only surmise it." With this reply, the Cartesian is ready
for treatment. To prepare the treatment Wittgenstein flatly
observes that taken straight-forwardly the Cartesian view
is simply wrong, since, "other people very often know when
I am in pain." But the treatment process must be working,
for that observation draws out the Cartesian opponent: "Yes,
but all the same not with the certainty with which I know
it myself!" Now, Wittgenstein deftly removes the offending
part: "It cannot be said of me at all . . .  that I know
I am in pain." The prized knowledge of one's own pain, upon
which the Cartesian view depends, is found to be at fault.
Notice, though, how the offending part is removed. Witt­
genstein does not assert that I do not know I am in pain; in­
stead, he asserts that "It cannot be said (emphasis mine) of
^Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3rd 
edition, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1969), paragraph 246.
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me . . . that I know I am in pain." Wittgenstein's appeal 
to what cannot be said is unmistakeable, for, in the 
remainder of 246 he continues the appeal: "It can't be said
other people cannot be said, I can't be said." This continues 
until the last sentence of 246, in which Wittgenstein appears 
to shift, appealing instead to what "it makes no sense to say." 
For now, I shall postpone discussing the subtle relationship 
between what it makes no sense to say and what cannot be said.
We have found, then, our first landmark, and so, one 
version of the so-called appeal to what we would say:
1. The appeal to what cannot be said— to what makes no sense. 
Though not accurately described as an appeal to what we would 
say, this first version gives one well-known target for 
critics of the appeal. This appeal has three distinguishing 
characteristics: 1) It is negative— "cannot be said, makes
no sense"; 2) it explicitly mentions the notion of making sense; 
3) it could not be supported simply by a survey of our speak­
ing habits, since it claims more than just what we would not, 
in fact, say.
But we should not leave 246 in haste, for it contains a
different example, one that ^  accurately described as an appeal
to what we would say. Recall the initial view of the Cartesian:
"Well, only I can know whether I am in pain; another person
can only surmise it." Wittgenstein, as he counters, appeals
to what we would, in fact say:
In one way this is wrong . . .  if we are using the word 
'to know' as it is normally used (and how else are we 
to use it?), then other people very often know when I am
in pain. (emphasis mine)
This appeal ^  accurately described as an appeal to what 
we would say. Wittgenstein, in effect, says that taken 
straightforwardly it is simply wrong to say that only I can 
know whether I am in pain, for if we were to listen to people 
talk we would find that very often they normally would say,
"I know he is in pain.
We have, then, our second landmark, and so, a second ver­
sion of the appeal to what we would say :
2. The appeal to what, in fact, we would normally say.
This differs in at least four ways from the first appeal:
1) It is positive rather than negative; 2) it has no explicit 
relation to the notion of making sense; 3) it depends more 
definitely upon simply finding out about the facts (such as,
"do people in fact say this?"); and 4) it does not appear 
to require argument, whereas showing what cannot be said is 
notorious for the disagreements it spawns.
Of course, Wittgenstein blended the two appeals in a 
two-staged treatment. As he said, "In one way this is 
wrong and in another nonsense." To show it was wrong, he . 
appealed to what, in fact, we would normally say; to show it 
was nonsense, he appealed to what we cannot say— to what
Ône must be careful. Wittgenstein says only that others 
often know when I am in pain, not that others often would 
say, "I know he is in pain. " I am assuming that I do not 
distort Wittgenstein. As we shall see later, he commonly 
"shifts" from what we would say to what is the case. This 
is sometimes because he argues as if an assertion can be 
true of a person if we can assert it sensibly of that person—  




But Wittgenstein is not the only philosopher to blend 
these appeals. They are blended by the practitioners of what 
has been called the "paradigm case" appeal. 0̂ We will see, 
though, that even when philosophers add their own design to 
paradigm case appeals, their appeals still fall into two 
classes that parallel Wittgenstein's two landmarks. In one 
class are appeals by J. L. Austin to the "plain man's" reaction, 
and by G. E. Moore (as described by Norman Malcolm) to "common 
sense." In the other class are appeals by Austin and Malcolm
to the "contrast" argument, and an appeal by Norman Malcolm 
(as a criticism of G. E. Moore) to what I shall call a "missing- 
ingredient" argument. First, let us see Austin and his "plain 
man. "
J.L. Austin values what the "plain man" would say.
In one of his lectures in Sense and Sensibilia Austin 
attacks A. J. Ayer's suggestion that the plain man believes 
that "when I look at a chair a few yards in front of me in 
broad daylight, my view is that I have (only) as much cer­
tainty as I need and can get that there is a chair and that 
there is room for doubt and suspicion that I see it."11 Austin 
attacks by imagining the reaction of the "plain man:"
l^The words "paradigm case" were first used, to my know­
ledge, by J. 0. Urmson in "Some Questions Concerning Validity," 
Essays In Conceptual Analysis (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1966), page 120.
11J. L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1968), page 10.
But in fact the plain man would regard doubt in such a 
case, not as far-fetched or even refined or somehow un­
practical, but as plain nonsense; he would say, quite 
correctly, "Well, if that's not seeing a real chair then 
I don't know what is.12
Here, Austin appeals to a natural linguistic reaction to a
philosophical utterance. Austin thus heightens the opposition
between the plain man and the philosopher, by having the plain 
man react with disbelief.
Such an appeal contrasts with Wittgenstein's two land­
marks. First, notice that, in contrast to Wittgenstein, Austin 
does not say "If we are using the words as they are normally 
used, then people very often see that this is a real chair.”
It is not that people commonly could be said to see that this 
is a real chair, but that when confronted with the philosophical 
utterance ("There is room for doubt and suspicion that I see 
this chair") the plain man would react to the philosopher and, 
only then, in disbelief object "If that's not seeing a real chair 
then I don't know what is I"
Second, in further contrast to Wittgenstein, the plain 
man does not explicitly assert but only implies the positive. 
"This a case of seeing a real chair." lihat the plain man 
proclaims is a conditional: "If that's not a case of x then
I don't know what is'." Now, one of the uses of a conditional 
is to emphasize what you are implying. The plain man thus 
emphatically announces, but only by implication, that "This 
is the very type, a paradigm case, of seeing a real
12lbid (emphasis is mine on "say").
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In 1942, in an essay "Moore and Ordinary Language," Norman
Malcolm describes Moore's Defense" as an appeal to paradigm 
14cases. Malcolm considers the philosophical statement "We 
do not know for certain the truth of any material-thing state­
ment. " Malcolm then paraphrases Moore's reply: "Both of
us know for certain that there are several chairs in this 
room, and how absurd it would be to suggest that we do not 
know it, but only believe it, or that it is highly probable 
but not really certain.Malcolm then attempts to describe 
Moore's reply:
Moore is right. What his reply does is to give us a 
paradigm of absolute certainty . . .  it appeals to our 
language-sense; to make us feel how queer and wrong 
it would be to say, when we sat in a room seeing and 
touching chairs, that we believed there were chairs 
but did not know it for certain, or that it is only 
highly probable that there were chairs . . .  By 
reminding us of how we ordinarily use the expressions 
"know for certain" and "highly probable," Moore's 
reply constitutes a refutation of the philosophical 
statement that we can never have certain knowledge 
of material-thing statements. It reminds us that 
there ^  an ordinary use of the phrase "know for 
certain" in which it is applied to empirical statements; 
and so shows us that Ayer is wrong when he says that 
"The notion of certainty does not apply to propositions of this kind."16
Here, Malcolm's Moore, like Austin's plain man, appeals to
a natural linguistic reaction to a philosophical utterance.
Moore thus heightens the opposition between our (the plain
Norman Malcolm, "Moore and Ordinary Language," The 
Philosophy of G. E. Moore, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp (La Salle: 
Open Court, 1968), p. 354.
^ Îbid., page 354.
l̂ Ibid., pages 354-355.
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man's) ordinary way of speaking and the philosopher's way of 
speaking, by having the ordinary man react and charge the 
philosopher with absurdity.
This appeal both contrasts with and is like Wittgenstein's 
landmarks. First, in contrast to Wittgenstein (but like 
Austin's plain man), Malcolm's Moore is speaking in reaction 
to a philosopher's doubt. Hence, Moore is not simply saying 
that people commonly could be said to know for certain that 
this is a real chair, but that when confronted with the philo­
sophical utterance ("We do not know for certain the truth of 
any material-thing statement"), Moore would react to the philo­
sopher and, only then, proclaim that "We ^  know for certain 
that this is a real chair'.
Second, like Wittgenstein (but in contrast to Austin's 
plain man), Malcolm's Moore explicitly asserts the positive 
affirmation "I ^  know for certain that this is seeing a 
real chair." Thus while Austin's plain man appeals only by 
implication to the paradigm case of seeing a real chair, Malcolm's 
Moore reminds us of the paradigm by asserting flatly "I know 
for certain that this is seeing a real chair." He even 
presents the paradigm to us.
What, then exactly, is a paradigm case? . Is it the real 
chair, seeing the real chair, saying that you see the real 
chair? It is difficult to answer this question, because the
l^Moore accepted this view of what he was doing, for he 
said in a 1949 letter to Malcolm "Of course (when I said 
that I know for certain that this is a real chair) I was 
using (these words) with a purpose— the purpose of disproving 
a general proposition which many philosophers have made."
(Malcolm, Thought and Knowledge, page 174).
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question unnaturally forces the words "paradigm case." The 
question to ask is not what ^  a paradigm case, but, rather, 
how does one use a paradigm case appeal?^® One answer to the 
question of use is seen in the third version of the appeal 
to what we would say: the appeal to paradigm cases— as a
reaction, without argument— to emphasize both what we would 
say and what it would be queer or improper to say.
How, then, is a paradigm case appeal used? For two purposes : 
to emphasize what we would say, and to emphasize what it 
would be queer or improper to say. And when is it used?
Only in response to some philosophical utterance.
If we use Malcolm's Moore as a guide, we can see clearly 
that such an appeal is a mixture of Wittgenstein's landmarks.
1) It is both positive and negative ("we ^  know for certain 
we do not merely believe"); 2) it has an explicit relation 
to the notion of making sense (Ayer violates our language- 
sense"); 3) it depends upon finding out the facts ("do we 
in fact say 'I know for certain'?"); and 4) it does not appear 
to require any accompanying argument, simply observations 
about how we ordinarily use certain expressions.
^^I realize this is controversial, but I want my cards 
on the table. It is not totally impossible to give a respectable 
answer to the question of what a paradigm case is; one respec­
table answer is that a paradigm case is simply an instance 
of what we would in fact normally (correctly) say— a correct, 
but not necessarily true, application of the expression 
in question. But this may seem to exclude Austin's plain 
man. Even worse, this formulation invites the (in this 
case) pseudo distinction between the paradigm case of seeing 
a real chair and the paradigm case of using the words "seeing 
a real chair." In Chapter Three, I shall discuss the sig­
nificance, or lack of it, of this "distinction."
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I wish by this information to call attention to the lack 
of argument accompanying this third class of appeals, in con­
trast to the fourth class of appeals that we will investi­
gate. Austin's plain man and Malcolm’s Moore both appealed 
to what simply was presumed to be true, but was not argued 
for. In fact, short of taking a survey, some philosophers 
find it hard to imagine how one could argue for a claim 
about what we would say. It seems even more difficult to 
show that something cannot be said— that it makes no sense.
One is naturally tempted to ask, "Upon what do you rest your 
case?"
Well, some paradigm case appeals do give reasons upon 
which to rest your case. Designed to show what we cannot 
say— what makes no sense such appeals usually take the form 
"You cannot say this because ..." In this class we find 
appeals by both Malcolm and Austin to the "contrast" argu­
ment, and a different appeal by Malcolm (as a criticism of 
Moore) to what I shall call a "missing ingredient" argument. 
First, the "contrast" argument.
Malcolm has made famous the hotly debated "contrast" ar­
gument, an argument that provides a singularly striking reason 
for opposing much that passes for insight in philosophy; Mal­
colm presents his case in a paper in which he attacks C. I 
Lewis, A. J. Ayer, Bertrand Russell, and any other philosopher 
who wants to say that no empirical statement can be certain. 
Malcolm states that contrast argument clearly and simply:
There are words in our language that operate in pairs.
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For example, there is "large" and "small", "hot" and 
"cold", "fast" and "slow", "probable" and "certain". 
Suppose that we banished the word "small" from the 
language, and applied the word "large" to everything, 
both large and small. It is obvious that if in de­
scribing an object to someone you said that it was 
"large" that would convey no information to him at all 
about the size of the object. The word "large" would be
a useless word. It is essential to the meaning of "large"
as it is now used, that large is contrasted with small.
If large ceases to be contrasted with small, the word 
"large" loses its meaning.
Similarly, if "it's probable" or "it's highly probable" 
were to precede eveiry empirical statement, these ex­
pressions would lose their meaning. For it is essential 
to the meaning of "probable" and "highly probable", that 
probability is contrasted with certainty. That is why 
it makes sense to say, "It's highly probable but not 
quite certain." If the application of "certain" to 
empirical statements were abolished, the word "probable" 
would also cease to be applied to them. For it would
have become a useless piece of language, a word which
conveyed no information.19
Malcolm is arguing that a philosopher cannot say that no
empirical statement is certain, because if that were true,
then the word 'certain' could not have a use (since it would
have no contrast). But it does have a use, so the philosopher
cannot be right. Furthermore, it would be pointless to 
adopt the philosopher's way of speaking, for the word 'certain' 
would be a useless word. In short, this simple argument
renders impotent the philosopher's claim. Not only is the 
philosopher shown to be wrong, if he claims his view to be 
true, but he is also shown to have no useful recommendation 
to make to us. It is no wonder that the contrast argument 
has been so hotly debated.
l^Norman Malcolm, "Certainty and Empirical Statements," 
Mind 51 (1942): pages 27-78.
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Thus blended, Wittgenstein's two landmarks provide a 
tidy response to the philosopher. But notice that Malcolm 
adds to the charge that something cannot be said; he adds an 
argument. He does not simply assert that something cannot be 
said, he gives reasons upon which to rest his case. Not only 
does he remind us of the normal, correct (paradigm) use of 
certain terms, but he observes that the paradigm use requires 
contrast; he argues that without contrast the terms would 
make no sense.
Two further characteristics of Malcolm's contrast argu­
ment place it in relation to the other appeals to what we 
would say. First, Malcolm reminds us of the paradigm, as if 
to remind us of what we normally do. Unlike Austin's plain 
man, Malcolm does not imply the paradigm in an exasperated 
conditional. Nor does he, like Malcolm's Moore, insist upon 
the paradigm simply to counter the philosopher's challenge. 
Instead, echoing Wittgenstein, Malcolm could be paraphrased 
as saying: "If we are using words as they are normally used,
then people would normally say 'It's highly probable but not 
quite certain'." Malcolm reminds us of what we would, in 
fact, normally say.
This suggests the second characteristic: Malcolm actually
presents the paradigm. He says, "It makes sense to say 'It's 
highly probable but not quite certain'." In contrast to 
Austin's plain man, who never really asserts the paradigm 
but only implies it, Malcolm (in the contrast argument) ac­
tually presents the paradigm. Here Malcolm's use of the
17
contrast argument resembles Malcolm's treatment of Moore—
in both cases the paradigms are, in fact, presented.
We have found, then, our fourth landmark, and so, a
fourth version of the appeal to what we would say:
4. The appeal to paradigm cases— plus supporting argument—  
to emphasize both what we would say and what it would be 
incorrect (a misuse of language) to say.
Such an appeal is thus a mixture of Wittgenstein's two land­
marks. 1) It is positive and negative ("probable" and 
"certain" ^  operate as pairs— "probable" and "certain" 
would have no meaning); 2) it has an explicit relation to 
the notion of making sense ("it makes no sense to say . . .") '
3) it seems to depend upon finding out about the facts ("do
words actually operate in pairs?— does it make sense to say
. . .?"); and 4) it does require accompanying argument to 
support the contrast thesis.
To show the features of this landmark, I want to consider 
two further examples : Austin's use of the contrast argument,
and Malcolm's use of a related argument. First, Austin.
Like Malcolm, Austin often uses a version of the contrast
argument. His memorable description "trouser word" has be­
come part of the technical language of philosophers. To 
illustrate Austin's use of the phrase "trouser word" and
thereby Austin's use of the contrast argument, let us watch 
Austin attack A. J. Ayer's use of the expression "directly
perceive." Austin picturesquely describes how a philosopher's
language can be distorted until it is useless :
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Now of course what brings us up short here is the word 
'directly*— a favourite among philosophers, but actually 
one of the less conspicuous snakes in the linguistic 
grass. We have here, in fact, a typical case of a word, 
which already has a very special use, being gradually 
stretched, without caution or definition or any limit, 
until it becomes, first perhaps obscurely metaphorical, 
but ultimately meaningless. One can't abuse ordinary 
language without paying for it.
It is essential to realize that here the notion of per­
ceiving indirectly wears the trousers— 'directly' takes 
whatever sense it has from the contrast with its opposite.20
Austin, like Malcolm, argues that if one stretches a phrase 
until it has no application, then it has been rendered use­
less. This applies especially to "trouser" words, words such 
as 'real' and 'free* that take their sense from the contrast 
with their opposite.
I classify this as a paradigm-case appeal because ulti­
mately it rests upon observing the paradigmatic use that 
an expression does in fact have. Notice how Austin develops 
the appeal. First, he notes that the use of "directly" in 
"directly perceive" brings us up short. Our sense of some­
thing out of line causes us to balk. We are struck that this 
is not the normal, correct use of the word "directly". Our 
sense of its paradigmatic use is upset. Second, Austin speaks 
of the word "directly" as having a special use, a paradigm 
use— suggesting that that use is violated by "being gradually 
stretched, without caution or definition or any limit, until 
it becomes, first perhaps obscurely metaphorical, but ultimately 
meaningless." This suggests that the word "directly" has an 
ordinary paradigmatic use, but that that use has been gradually
Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, page 15.
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distorted. Fourth, he confirms this suggestion by. saying,
"One can't abuse ordinary language without paying for it."
For Austin, then, ordinary language contains an ordinary 
paradigmatic use of the word "directly". Austin appeals 
to this paradigm by showing how the philosopher has deviated 
from it.
If Austin had simply pointed out how the philosopher's 
use deviates from our ordinary use, then we could classify 
this simply as a sophisticated appeal to what we would say; 
an attempt to remind us of the ordinary use of "directly", 
not by just rehearsing it, but also by showing how the 
philosopher's use gradually deviates from the ordinary use.
But Austin does more; he presents an argument. He argues 
that the word "directly" "takes whatever sense it has from 
the contrast with its opposite." So the philosopher who uses 
"directly perceive" must be able to tell us what "indirectly 
perceive" means; otherwise, "directly perceive" would have 
no use.
We can see two similarities between Austin's contrast 
argument and his presentation of the "plain man's" objections. 
One, in neither case does Austin actually present the paradigm 
In the case of the plain man, Austin has him imply the para­
digm; similarly, in the case of the contrast argument, Austin 
only implies the ordinary use of the word "directly"; he 
never in fact gives an example of it. Two, in both cases the 
primary reason for speaking was to react or to counter the 
philosopher's way of speaking: with the plain man, to show
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the philosopher doing something that was plainly absurd; with 
the contrast argument, to show how the philosopher had gone 
wrong. One could even interpret Austin as providing guidelines 
for combatting philosophers. The plain man's guideline would 
be to determine whether the philosopher is implicitly denying 
something that is obviously the case; the contrast guideline 
would be to determine whether the philosopher has stretched 
a word beyond its normal contrast.
We have found, then, another version of our fourth, land­
mark. Austin's "trouser word" version of the contrast argu­
ment meets all the criteria. Austin appeals to paradigm cases 
(to the paradigm use of "directly"); Austin provides supporting 
arguments (the "trouser word" argument); he tries both to 
emphasize what we would say (we would use "directly" in 
contrast to "indirectly") and to emphasize what it would be 
incorrect, a misuse of language, to say (philosophers misuse 
"directly" in the phrase "directly perceive").
This "trouser word" version of the contrast argument blends 
Wittgenstein's two landmarks. 1) It is positive and nega­
tive (We would contrast "directly" with "indirectly"— "one 
can ipt abuse ordinary language"); 2) It has an explicit 
relation to the notion of making sense ("'directly' takes what 
sense it has. . ."); 3) It seems to depend upon finding out 
about the facts ("do people in fact contrast 'directly' with 
indirectly'?"); and 4) It does appear to require accompanying 
argument to support the "trouser" thesis.
Malcolm and Austin, then, not only recite how we would in
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fact speak, but they also give-reasons for the claim that 
we cannot talk the way the philosopher recommends. In both 
cases, Malcolm and Austin used the contrast argument to 
attack other philosophers. Malcolm continues this attack in 
a now famous criticism of G. E. Moore. Though the earlier 
Malcolm had used a paradigm case argument to explain and de­
fend Moore ("Moore is appealing to the paradigm case of ab­
solute certainty"), Malcolm now attacks Moore for presenting 
a view that, though improved over earlier philosophers, is 
still not quite correct.
In his attack on Moore, Malcolm accompanies the paradigm 
case appeal with a new argument, an argument that I shall call 
the "missing ingredient argument." This agrument has three 
parts: 1) an enumeration of paradigmatic uses of an ex­
pression, 2) a claim about what is an essential ingredient 
to those paradigms, and 3) a charge that the proposed philo­
sophical use lacks the ingredient essential to the paradigms. 
The conclusion of this appeal is again about what we cannot 
say— what makes no sense; it is noticeably buttressed by the 
"missing-ingredient" argument. I could also call it the 
"missing context" argument, since the missing ingredient is 
usually thought to be missing because the philosopher has 
stripped the expression of its context, with the implication 
that in its proper context (in paradigmatic instances of the 
correct application of the expression) the expression is 
harmless, that is, not philosophically significant. Again, 
Norman Malcolm is a modern master. This time, rather than
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defend Moore, Malcolm subtly attacks Moore's "Defense of 
Common Sense." Recall that Moore claimed that there were a 
number of things that he knew, with certainty, to be true. 
Malcolm asks us to consider one of these cases. Suppose, 
says Malcolm, that he and Moore are sitting together facing 
a tree. On Moore's view, it would apparently be correct for 
him to say to Malcolm, "I know that that (pointing at the 
tree) is a tree."^^Malcolm invokes a "missing-ingredient" ar­
gument to show that Moore's statement is incorrect. Malcolm 
says that Moore's statement is a misuse of language. First, 
Malcolm enumerates the paradigms, that is, several instances 
in which the sentence "I know that that is a tree" would be 
correctly used. Then, Malcolm notices the common "ingredients" 
in each paradigm instance:
Let us notice some features common to these cases: (1)
There is in each case a question at issue and a doubt 
to be removed. (2) In each case the person who asserts 
"I know that that's a tree" is able to give a reason for 
his assertion. (3) In each case there is an investigation 
which,, if it were carried out, would settle the question at 
issue.22
Shortly after showing that "all these features are missing" 
when Moore says in a philosophical context "I know that that's 
a tree," Malcolm concludes that Moore's use of the expression 
"I know" is a misuse, since it is contrary to the ordinary and 
correct use.
Notice that Malcolm enumerates the paradigm uses, as if
2lNorman Malcolm, "Defending Common Sense," Philosophical 
Review 54 (1949): pages 202-203.
Ibid., page 203.
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they were uses that a non-philosopher might easily encounter. 
Unlike Austin's plain man, Malcolm does not just suggest 
or imply the paradigm uses, but in fact asserts them. This 
also contrasts with Austin's "trouser-word" argument in which 
the paradigm uses were never actually asserted, only implied.
Furthermore, Malcolm asserts the paradigms as if they 
were uses that did not require for their sense the context of 
responding to philosophers. Unlike Austin's plain man, Mal­
colm does not reply in exasperation or with incredulous dis­
belief, rather, Malcolm simply rehearses some actual uses 
of the words "I know" and concludes from that rehearsal that 
the philosopher's use deviates from the ordinary use. This 
is also unlike Malcolm's Moore, for he too insisted that the 
philosopher was mistaken; he meant to establish that error 
by giving some paradigm examples of what we do know for certain. 
Malcolm, in contrast to Austin and Moore, appeals to the para­
digms, not in reaction after the philosopher offers his the­
sis, but preparatory to the philosopher's assertion. In 
short", Malcolm's paradigms do not require the philosopher's 
use for their sense.
The "missing-ingredient" argument provides another clear 
example of the fourth landmark. There is an appeal to para­
digm cases ("these are normal, correct uses of 'I know'"), 
there is supporting argument ("therefore the philosopher's 
use must be a misuse, since the essential ingredient is missing"), 
and there is an emphasis both on what we would say ("We would 
say 'I know' in this circumstance") and on what would be
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incorrect, a misuse of language, to say ("Moore's use of 'I 
know' is a misuse").
As we shall see later, many other contemporary philoso­
phers employ the "missing ingredient" argument.But, for 
now, our goal is simply to locate landmarks in the misunder­
stood terrain of the appeal to what we would say. Malcolm's 
example stands as a clear landmark. It has the essential 
ingredients; enumerate paradigms, spot common ingredients 
in the paradigms, and conclude that the philosophical use is 
a misuse.
Unlike the earlier paradigm case appeals, the fourth 
landmark (the contrast arguments and the missing ingredients 
argument) contains supporting arguments. Those philosophers 
who wish to attack this version of the appeal must do more 
than argue about what we would say. Let us turn now to 
such attacks on the appeal to what we would say.
The "Queer But True" Attacks On The Appeal To What We Would Say
"Of course we would not say that, but I want to know 
whether it is true'." With this, the philosopher concedes "queer­
ness" but will not surrender "truth." We see, now, the strategy of
23One may wonder why Wittgenstein is not used as a prime 
example. He does seem to use a missing ingredient agrument at 
the end of paragraph 246: "The truth is: it makes sense to say 
about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but 
not to say it about myself." Isn't Wittgenstein implying that 
since saying "I know" requires the ingredient of doubt, and 
since doubt can never be present in the case of one's own pain, 
that, therefore, because of the missing ingredient one cannot 
say "I know I am in pain"? Yes, he is. But (1) the argument 
is only implied and my goal is to present clear landmarks, and 
(2) Malcolm is a more frequent target for critics of this ver­
sion of the appeal to what we would say.
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the "queer but true" attacks on the appeal to what we would 
say; Let the ordinary language philosopher counter with (in 
Russells* words) "the different ways in which silly people 
can say silly things," but when he is finished, let him know 
he has missed the prize; though he put up a good show, he leaves 
empty-handed. Thus defused ordinary language philosophy is 
rendered incidental. Again in Russell's words "If this is 
all that philosophy has to offer, I cannot think it worthy 
of study."
The status of ordinary language philosophy is at stake. 
Whether it is worthy of study will depend partly upon whether 
the queerness of an expression has any bearing on the possible 
truth of that expression. Those philosophers who deliver the 
"queer but true" attacks on the appeal to what we would say, 
rightly sense the prize they are defending: if it could be
shown that an assertion's being queer precludes its being 
true, many assertions of philosophers could not be true.
With so much at stake, it is no surprise that the appeal 
to what we would say is one of the favorite targets of philo­
sophers. The many attacks divide into groups according to 
the kind of argument given, according to the kind of target, 
and according to the underlying philosophy behind the attack. 
Since they divide most naturally according to the kind of ar­
gument given, I will introduce them with such a division.
After introducing them, then, in Chapter Two we can explore 
how the different kinds of attack are partly determined by 
the underlying philosophy of the attacker and partly by the
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kind of target being attacked.
Though Russell conveys the spirit of most attacks, he 
does not offer serious argument to support his challenge. 
Accordingly, I shall begin with White who does mount a 
sophisticated argument that goes to the heart of the appeal 
to what we would say. A specific version of White's more 
general argument is given by Dretske in a popular argument 
that is used, often unwittingly, by the unwary defenders
of the appeal to what we would say. Dretske's argument 
will suggest a general argument that Searle delivers in a 
sweeping rejection of the significance of the appeal to what 
we would say. It will remain then, for G.E. Moore, in a letter 
to Norman Malcolm, to open a new line of attack, one that I 
will also exploit in Chapter Five in an attempt to state the 
nature of many philosophical assertions.
White's Attack 
White provides a clear example of a "queer but true" 
attack on the so-called pragmatic paradox, a version of what 
is called "Moore's paradox." The paradox is that one cannot 
say, for example, "I believe that Sam robbed the store, but 
he did not." Because of this paradox some philosophers would 
conclude that the sentence cannot be true. White does not
agree.
(The sentence) "I believe that (Sam robbed the store), 
but he did not," though a queer thing to say, is perfectly 
capable of being quite true.24
24white, Modal Thinking, page 51.
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White concedes that it would be queer to say, but does not 
surrender the possibility that it might be true.
But, White does sometimes surrender this possibility.
He distinguishes between an expression's being inappropriate 
or improper and an expression's being illogical. He makes 
this distinction in a discussion of a typical assertion 
from the McCarthy Era. During the McCarthy Era it was, of
course, not flattering to have Senator McCarthy announce 
that you were not a communist, since his saying so suggested 
that your not being one was somehow noteworthy. In the quo­
tation below. White distinguishes being inappropriate from 
being illogical, and then argues that an inappropriate ex­
pression "may have been perfectly true," whereas an illogical 
expression "could not have been either true or false."
It may have been inappropriate for Senator McCarthy to 
announce that Dr. Pusey was not a communist, since there 
was no reason to suppose he was or that anyone had 
suggested that he was. But it would have been downright 
illogical of the Senator to say that Dr. Pusey was no 
longer (had ceased to be) a communist, if he had never 
been a communist. 'Dr. Pusey is not a communist' may 
have been perfectly true, whatever the circumstances; but 
'Dr. Pusey is no longer (has ceased to be) a communist' 
could not have been either true or false, unless Dr.
Pusey had once been a communist.
According to White, then, the queerness of an expression would 
or would not preclude the truth of that expression, depending 
upon whether the expression was illogical or merely inappro­
priate.
25Alan R. White, "Mentioning the Unmentionable, "Sympo­
sium on J. L. Austin (London: Routledge and Began Paul, 1969), 
page 225 (emphasis mine).
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If we combine White's comments about our version of 
Moore's Paradox with his comments about McCarthy's pronoun­
cement, then we can conclude that IVhite thinks the sentence 
"I believe that Sam robbed the store but he did not" is not 
illogical but merely inappropriate to say. If White thought 
it were illogical, he would have surrendered its possible 
truth.
White's attack on the appeal to what we would say is 
directed against the philosopher who argues that since it is 
inappropriate (or improper) to say something that therefore 
it could not be true. If the philosopher argued that an 
expression was illogical, then White would agree that it 
could not be true.
But what about the philosopher who argues not that what is 
said is itself illogical but that one's saying it is illogi­
cal? Can doing something be illogical, for White? We must 
determine White's answer to this question, since to evaluate 
the appeal to what we would say we need to know whether it is 
what one says or one's saying it that is to be appraised.
White unites the two. He argues that (1) it is primarily 
what we can say that can be illogical, but that (2) our saying 
it can be illogical if certain conditions are not satisfied.
To see these two parts united, let's follow White's discussion 
of what he calls certain "concepts". White uses the words 
"makes sense" and "does not make sense" as interchangeable 
with the words "logical" and "illogical." By this usage, 
for example, it makes no sense (is illogical) to say that Dr.
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Pusey was no longer a communist if he had not previously 
been one. We can see this dual position in the division 
of the following quotation from "Mentioning the Unmention­
able":
(1) In no circumstances would it make sense to say, 
nor would it be true or false, that someone knew 
the date of the Battle of Waterloo, carefully... The 
concept of care can never go with the concept of 
knowledge...Consequently, the very sentence 'He 
knew carefully the Battle of Waterloo* is meaning­
less.
(2) On the other hand, in certain circumstances, but 
not in all, it would not make sense to say (for 
example) that someone had sobered up, namely, if 
he had not previously been drunk.26
White's two-part position is that (1) what is said is illo­
gical (makes no sense) if there are no circumstances in 
which it would make sense to say it, and (2) one's saying 
it is illogical (makes no sense) if certain circumstances 
are not satisfied. Of course, one's saying something that 
itself was illogical would presumably count as illogical, 
as well.
If something is illogical or if saying it would make no 
sense, then White would hold that its being thus queer 
(illogical) precludes it from being true. He obviously 
holds this view of illogical sentences, but also holds it 
of our saying things that are illogical only in certain cir­
cumstances :
It would not be true to say of a man who had not been 
drunk and was not now drunk that he had not sobered
^%hite. Mentioning the Unmentionable," pages 222-223 
(emphasis mine).
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up, but it would equally not be true to say that he 
had sobered up.2'
Even if saying something (not what is said) is illogical
(queer), White would say it cannot be true. Accordingly,
White's "queer but true" attack on the appeal to what we
would say is limited only to what is not illogical.
Accordingly, to determine whether something is a genuine
candidate for being queer but true, one must determine whether
it is illogical. There are, broadly speaking, two cases
to consider: (1) Is what is said itself illogical? and (2)
Is saying it in these circumstances illogical? If one can
determine the answer to the first question, then White can
tell one how to determine the answer to the second question.
White's method is what I shall call "White's Test." White
suggests the test in the following quotation:
This is not, however, to say that the sentence 'He has 
now sobered up' is meaningless, although the sentence 
'He has now sobered up, though he was not drunk before'may be meaningless.^8
White suggests that if it is illogical to say something (even 
though what is said may itself not be illogical), then the
sentence formed by conjoining what is said with the statement 
of the unsatisfied circumstance will be illogical. Now, to 
check whether it is illogical to say something, philosophers 
can simply inspect a sentence, and avoid the complexities of 
viewing saying as something that we do.
2?lbid., page 223.
2®White, "Mentioning the Unmentionable," page 223.
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We have found, then, a kind of landmark. Something 
said can be queer but possibly true, if vAiat is said is itself 
not illogical and if to say it is not to do something that 
is illogical. Traditionally, philosophers have concerned 
themselves with determining whether sentences themselves 
are illogical, but now we have White's Test to determine 
whether doing something is illogical, that is, we have a 
test to determine whether saying something is illogical even 
if what is said itself is not. If we use the familiar term 
"presupposition" for a circumstance that must be fulfilled 
for a sentence to be either true or false, then we can state 
White's Test:
White's Test: It is illogical to say something if (1) to say
it would presuppose the truth of a circumstance, and (2) the 
conjunction of what is said with the statement of that cir­
cumstance is illogical.
Let's try out White's Test on McCarthy's pronouncement 
that Dr. Pusey is no longer a communist. For Senator McCarthy 
to say this is to presuppose the circumstance that Dr. Pusey 
was once a communist. If we conjoin McCarthy's pronouncement 
with the statement that the circumstance is not satsified, 
we get the (in White's sense) illogical sentence: "Dr. Pusey
is no longer a communist but he never was a communist." Using 
White's Test, we conclude that it would be illogical to say 
"Dr. Pusey is no longer a communist." To try to say so would 
be not only to do something queer but also something that could 
never be true, since it is illogical. Accordingly, White 
would not use a queer-but-true attack on McCarthy's pronounce­
ment.
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But White does use queer but true attacks on things that
are not illogical to say, but that a merely, as White calls
them, inappropriate. With one simple challenge. White goes
to the heart of the appeal to what we would say:
(It can be a mistake to confuse) what is true to say 
with what it is proper to say . . .  (for) . . . (there 
is a confusion between) the inappropriateness of saying 
certain things . . . and the possible truth of such things.29
If saying something is not illogical then even though what is 
said is queer (inappropriate), White will not surrender the 
possibility that the assertion might be true. Accordingly,
White would attack those philosophers who argue that since 
an assertion was queer it could not be true.
White's attack seems simple enough. Just determine whether 
saying something is illogical. If not, then even if it is 
queer (inappropriate) it is still possible for it to be true.
Let's try White's Test on the case mentioned earlier in which 
when Malcolm and Moore were sitting together facing a tree.
Recall that on Moore's view it would be correct for him to 
say to Malcolm, "I know that that (pointing at the tree) is 
a tree." Recall also that Malcolm, by appealing to the
paradigm cases of saying "I know", argued that Moore's use of 
"I know" was a misuse, since the "ingredients" essential to
properly saying "I know" were "missing."
Now, with White's Test, we can determine whether it is 
illogical for Moore to say what he does. All we need to do is
29white, Modal Thinking, pages 50 and 172 (emphasis mine . 
on "true" and on "proper").
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conjoin the sentence "I know that that's a tree" with the 
statement that the circumstances are not satisfied. Though 
it will be cumbersome let's contruct this conjunction.
The circumstances to be satisfied in each paradigm 
case of saying 'I know' are listed below:
(1) There is in each case a question at issue and a doubt to 
be removed.
(2) In each case the person who says "I know that that is 
a tree" is able to give a reason for what he says.
(3) In each case there is an investigation which, if it were 
carried out, would settle the question at issue.30
We want to say that these conditions are not satisfied, so 
we want to consider the statement of the failure to be satis­
fied:
Statement that conditions are not satsified: There is no
question at issue, no doubt to be removed, no reason for 
saying this, and no investigation to settle any question.
Changing the word order slightly and condensing somewhat we
get one possible version of the desired conjunction:
Desired Conjunction for White's Test: Though there is no
question at issue (hence no need for any investigation) and 
though there is no doubt to be removed nor any reason for 
me to say so> still I know that that's a tree.
Though we might not know why anyone would ever say this, it
certainly does not seem illogical in the way it is illogical 
to say "He is no longer drunk, but he never was."
But, must we rely on a vague feeling of its not seeming 
to be illogical? The answer is a clear "Noi" For, Fred I. 
Dretske provides a clear test to determine whether such a 
conjunction is illogical.
30Malcolm, "Defending Common Sense," page 203.
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Fred I. Dretske's Attack: The Shift
In a section appropriately entitled "Seeing Saying
We S e e , "31 Dretske provides test to determine whether it
is illogical to assert something: just "shift" the tense
or person of what is said. Dretske illustrates the "shift" on
the sentence "I see a bus approaching, but I do not believe
a bus is approaching."
Whereas it is paradoxical to say, 'I see a bus approaching, 
but I do not believe a bus is approaching *. , . it is quite 
routine to say, 'I saw a bus, but, at the time, did not 
know what it was *. or 'He sees the bus but cannot make out 
what it is.
(Thus) as soon as the tense, or the person, of the report 
is shifted the possibilities for confusion (about the 
report's being odd to say and its being true) diminish 
considerably.32
Here we have a simple test to determine whether something is 
queer but not illogical to say. Just see whether by changing 
either the tense or the person, one can produce a sentence 
that could be true. If so, then the original sentence was not 
illogical to assert.
Let's apply Dretske's test^^ to White's first paradoxical 
sentence "I believe that Sam robbed the store but he did not."
To apply the test we must determine whether it is illogical
31pred I. Dretske, Seeing and Knowing, page 37.
32it could be misleading to call this "Dretske's." White 
uses it as do many other philosophers. I do not mean even 
to suggest that philosophers got it from Dretske. I give the 
test "Dretske's name because he is the first to formulate 
the test, though, of course, other philosophers occasionally 
use it (in many cases without knowing it)." The real irony is 
that Wittgenstein uses it. I shall make much more of this in 
Chapter Two, but for now it may suffice to recall that Witt­
genstein's actual words were : "It cannot be said of me that
I know that I am in pain."
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for me to say now "I believe that Sam robbed the store but 
he did not." We simply "shift” tense to "(Yesterday) I 
believed that Sam robbed the store, but he did not" or 
"shift" the person to have someone say of me "Jones believes 
that Sam robbed the store but Sam did not." Neither "shifted" 
sentence is illogical in White's sense; that is, it is possible 
for either new sentence to be true (recall that White's illo­
gical sentences are true in no circumstances). By Dretske's 
reasoning, since neither of-the new sentences is illogical, 
then the original first-person, present-tense assertion was 
not illogical, just inappropriate to say. It follows, further, 
that it could be queer but true to say "I believe that Sam 
robbed the store but he did not."
Now for the crucial determination, can Dretske's "shift" 
help us to determine whether it is illogical for Moore to 
say "I know that that's a tree"? Moore's assertion is illogical? 
If White is correct in his charge that it is not illogical for 
Moore to do so, then we should be able to shift the tense or 
person of what Moore says to produce a sentence that could be 
true.
The conjunctive sentence (somewhat shortened) is: "Though 
I have no reason to say so, I know that that's a tree." If 
we shift to past-tense this becomes : "Though I had no reason
to say so, I knew that that was a tree." If we shift to 
third-person it becomes: "Though has no reason to say so,
Jones knows that that's a tree." Since these new sentences 
could be true, we have a kind of "proof" that White is correct;
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what Moore said, though queer to say, could be true.
To many philosophers, A White-style attack together 
with Dretske*s "shift" argument suggests a more general 
queer but true argument against the appeal to what we would
say. A White-style attack establishes that certain sentences 
are just inappropriate to say, not illogical. Since they are 
not illogical, nothing precludes their being true. And, with 
Dretske *s "shift" eirgument one can "prove" that those sen­
tences can be true. Taken together, these two queer but 
true attacks suggest a general diagnosis for the problem.
There is evidently an important distinction between asser- 
tability and truth, for even when the conditions or circum­
stances for asserting something are not satisfied, what is 
asserted could still be true. John R. Searle develops this
diagnosis of the problem in his queer but true attack on the 
appeal to what we would say.
John R. Searle's Attack: The Assertion Fallacy
Searle seems to have Wittgenstein's number. Listen as
he describes Wittgenstein (and Malcolm) at work:
Linguistic philosophers (Wittgenstein and Malcolm) wish 
to analyze the meaning of such troublesome concepts as 
knowledge. . .To do this they look to the use of such 
expressions as "know". . .The trouble with this method 
is that in practice it about always amounts to asking 
when we would make assertions of the form "I know that so 
and so". . .For example, Wittgenstein points out that 
under normal conditions, when I have a pain, it would be 
odd to say "I know that I am in pain."33
^^John R. Searle, Speech Acts (London, Cambridge University 
Press, 1970), page 141 (emphasis nine).
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Searle seems right. Wittgenstein does talk of how the word 
’know’ is used, Malcolm does argue that Moore’s use of "I 
know* is a misuse, Malcolm does identify the normal conditions 
for correctly asserting ’I know,’ and Wittgenstein does con­
tend that it makes no sense (is odd?) to say about himself 
that he knows that he is in pain.
But to accept Searle’s description of Wittgenstein and 
Malcolm at work, seems to be to accept Searle's diagnosis of 
a general mistake that he thinks Wittgenstein and Malcolm 
make. In Searle’s view, though Wittgenstein and Malcolm have 
thought they were discovering something about knowledge it­
self, they might only have discovered conditions for making 
assertions. For, if you only consider cases of asserting 
"I know", how can you determine whether your conclusions are 
about knowledge or about asserting? As Searle puts the charge:
(IF the philosopher asks) when we would make assertions of 
the type "I know that so and so". . .then there is no easy 
way to tell how much their answers to these questions 
depend on what it is to make assertions and how much is 
due to the concept (of knowledge) that the philosopheris trying to analyze.34
Perhaps Malcolm’s ("ingredients") that must be satisfied to 
assert "I know" were simply conditions that must be satisfied 
simply to assert anything.
Searle is right that Wittgenstein and Malcolm do not con­
centrate upon asserting, instead of concentrating on, for 
example, or questioning or commanding. Questioning, command­
ing, and asserting are all what Searle calls different kinds
34Ibid.
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of "speech acts." So it may be true that Wittgenstein and
Malcolm commit what Searle calls the assertion fallacy:
Assertion Fallacy: The assertion fallacy . . .is the fallacy 
of confusing the conditions for the performance of the speech 
act of assertion with the analysis of the meaning of particular 
words occurring in certain assertions.35
Searle*s point is that though there are many things we can 
do with words, only one of them is to assert. And since asser­
tion is "only one kind of speech act among many," it is a 
mistake to suppose that "the conditions in which it is correct 
to assert ("I know") are identical with the conditions in which 
it is the case that (I know)."36
How then could Wittgenstein and other philosophers have 
confused the queerness (or inappropriateness) of an assertion 
with its possible truth? Searle*s general diagnosis is that 
they confused the conditions for asserting something with the 
conditions for its truth.
Searle's diagnosis does seem to confirm White's and Dret­
ske 's positions that though a sentence can be inappropriate 
to say it can still be true. But that raises a crucial question; 
If it is inappropriate to assert something (since the conditions 
for asserting it are not satisfied) but in spite of that im­
propriety a philosopher makes the assertion how is one to 
understand what the philosopher says? For, since conditions 
for asserting are not satisfied, the words do not have their 
normal use. Can they still be said to have their normal sense?
35Ibid.
SGgearle, "Assertions and Aberrations,” page 218.
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If they don't have their normal sense, what, exactly is it, 
whose truth philosophers are so reluctant to surrender?
One reply to this question is that the words still 
have their normal sense, but have a special (philosopher's) 
use. G. E. Moore develops such a reply in his queer but 
true attacks on the appeal to what we would say.
Moore's Attack: The Philosopher's Use of Words
If Searle had Wittgenstein's number, Moore has Malcolm's 
complete dossier. Moore seems clearly to understand both 
what Malcolm says and what's wrong with it. Recall that 
Malcolm and Moore were sitting on a bench in front of a tree, 
when Moore said, "I know that that's a tree." Malcolm 
challenged that Moore's use of 'I know' was a misuse, since 
the paradigmatic circumstances for that use were not satis­
fied.
Moore does not allow Malcolm's challenge to go unanswered. 
Moore agrees that the words "I know that that's a tree" do not 
have their ordinary use, since the ordinary circumstances for 
saying 'I know' are not satisfied. But Moore does not agree 
that his use is a misuse; he thinks that such a charge is con­
fused, since it collapses the distinction between certain words 
having no sense and those words being used senselessly. Moore 
thinks that he used his words senselessly (in that the circum­
stances were not satisfied), still the words that he used 
had their normal sense. And Moore tells us with what purpose 
he was using these words : to attempt to refute other philo­
sophers. If a purpose can count as a use, then, Moore thinks.
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his words had a use: the philosopher's use. In a 1949 letter
to Malcolm, Moore recalls, clarifies, and appears to defeat 
Malcolm's challenge. Moore seems almost to be lecturing
Malcolm, as he reminds Malcolm of the time together:
Sitting in my garden two years ago, I pointed or nodded 
at the young walnut-tree and said "I know that that is 
a tree." You wanted then, and want now, to say that my 
use of that expression was a "misuse" and "incorrect"; 
but the only reason you give for saying so is that I 
used it under circumstances under which it would not 
ordinarily be used, e.g., under the circumstances that 
there neither was at the moment nor had been just pre­
viously any doubt whether it was a tree or not. But 
that I used it under circumstances under which it would 
not ordinarily be used is no reason for saying I misused 
it or used it incorrectly, if, though this was so, I was 
using it in the sense in which it is ordinarily used—  
was using it to make the assertion which it is ordinarily 
used to make; and the argument I've just given is an 
argument designed to show you that I was using it in the 
ordinary sense, though not under any ordinary circum­
stances . . .
If a person, under circumstances in which everybody could 
see quite clearly that a certain object was a tree, were 
to (say) "I know that that's a tree," we might well say 
that that was a senseless thing for him to do. . .But 
this is an entirely different thing from saying that the 
words in question don't, on that occasion "make sense,"
. . .It is perfectly possible that a person who uses 
them sense lessly, in the sense that he uses them where 
no sensible person would use them because under those 
circumstances, they serve no useful purpose, should be 
using them in their normal sense, & that what he asserts 
by so using them should be true. . .
Of course in my case, I was using them with a purpose—  
the purpose of disproving a general proposition which 
many philosophers have made.57
It is a confusion, then, for Malcolm to think that because 
words don't have their ordinary use they have no use. The
57Norman Malcolm, Thought and Knowledge, page 174 (my 
division into paragraphs).
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philosopher may be able to continue to talk, for his 
inappropriate ways of speaking may be excepted since he 
is using his words to reply to other philosophers. Moore, 
defends a philosopher’s use of words.
To the challenge that since the words do not have the 
normal use (are queer or inappropriate) they could not be 
true, Moore would reply, "Insofar as they have their normal 
sense they can still be true." Moore would then attack those 
philosophers who argue that since an assertion is queer it 
cannot be true.
Moore's view opens an entire, new line of attack. The 
possibility now opens up of a philosopher’s diverting the appeal 
to what we would say by simply countering that he is using 
the words to reply to a philosopher. Perhaps Russell was 
right that it is not valuable to concern yourself with "the 
ways in which silly people can say silly things." For, 
philosophers may be using words in a special, at least, 
non-ordinary way. If so, then it would seem irrelevant 
to appeal to what we would normally say, for the only conclu­
sion that one could draw would be that the philosopher was 
not using words in their ordinary use. But one is tempted to 
reply, "So what. I want to know whether what the philosopher 
said could be trueI"
The case for "queer but true" seems strong. It seems 
things can be queer to say, yet still be true; or, so it seems. 
But this observation prompts many questions; Can significant 
philosophical assertions be queer but true? If so, what counts
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as a clear example? Are there any limits to what philosophers 
can say to each other? And, if there are limits, will de­
lineating those limits reveal something about the nature of 
philosophical assertions? Or can we even characterize philo­
sophical assertions by themselves as if they were a separate 
class?
These questions, and more, seem to need answers. But 
even to understand the questions, one must understand the queer 
but true attacks on the appeal to what we would say. For, as 
I shall argue, if the attacks are successful, a wedge will be 
driven between assertability and truth, a wedge that permits 
the very formulation of the question, "Can an assertion be 
queer but true?" Thus the first task is to clarify and appraise 
the queer but true attacks.
In the work that follows I shall attempt a defense of
the appeal to what we would say. But I shall not argue that 
the appeal is "correct," whatever that would be to do. Instead, 
I shall argue that a certain kind of attack on the appeal is 
mistaken attack. I hope to show that the queer but true attacks
on the appeal to what we would say all fail in three ways ;
(1) they misconstrue the use of the appeal, (2) they mis­
construe the conclusion of the appeal, and (3) they give argu­
ments that would not be successful even if they did not mis­
construe the use and conclusion of the appeal.
It may appear that a severe limitation is thus imposed 
upon philosophers, if they must be limited to what we would 
say. But, it will emerge that (to put it cryptically) though 
philosophers are limited to what we would say, that is no
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limitation.
I shall proceed by taking each main attack in turn, 
clarifying it, showing that to give it is to misconstrue 
the use and conclusion of the appeal. Let's turn now to 
the first queer but true attack that we encountered: White's
charge that an inappropriate or queer sentence, if not illo­
gical, might be true.
CHAPTER II
INAPPROPRIATE BUT NOT ILLOGICAL
White charges that even though what a philosopher 
says may be inappropriate, that does not preclude its being 
true. For, he argues, if vdiat the philosopher says is not 
illogical, then even though what he says is inappropriate 
it might be true,
I shall argue, on the contrary, that White's argu­
ment is mistaken; that he is wrong to argue that an inappro­
priate but not illogical sentence might be true. Of course. 
White's argument has two parts : (1) some sentences are in-
appropriate though not illogical, and (2) inappropriate 
sentences that are not illogical might be true. I intend 
now^ to dispute only the second part. I shall argue that 
even if a sentence is inappropriate, it is a mistake to 
argue that that sentence if not illogical might be true.
I say "now" since in Chapter Four I suggest that it 
is not quite correct to characterize so many sentences as 
"inappropriate." Furthermore, in Chapter Three I argue 




I shall present four main criticisms of those philo­
sophers who give this White-style attack on the appeal to what 
we would say. First, those White-style opponents of the 
appeal misunderstood its use; they ignore or fail to see 
the important initial stages of the appeal, stages that show 
its use as a reaction or response. Second, the opponents 
wrongly think that the conclusion of the appeal to what we 
would say is that something cannot be true: they either mis­
understand that the initial stages of the appeal don't deliver 
this conclusion, or they unjustifiably impose an "excluded
middle" option that either a sentence can be true or it 
cannot be true. Third, the White-style opponents attack that 
they wrongly believe to be the conclusion of the appeal, and 
ignore the numerous arguments given in the appeal. Fourth, 
as a corolary of the above points, the intended beneficiaries 
of the defeat of the appeal would not in fact profit from its 
demise, for even if one were to establish that a sentence 
could be true, it would not follow that it might be true.
To develop these four criticisms we need first to get 
clear on exactly what kind of appeal a White-style attack is 
against. After seeing what kind of appeal it is against, 
we will be in a position to notice in more detail the complex 
philosophical use of the appeal to what we would say: its
important initial stages, its intended conclusion, and its 
arguments. Only after noticing the complex use, can we under­
stand that to. give a White-style attack is to ignore or fail to 
see the initial stages, to misconstrue the intended conclusion, 
and to miss the arguments in its favor. Let's examine now what
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kind of appeal a White-style attack is against.
What a White-style Attack is Against
First, notice what a White-style attack is designed,
naturally to go against. White says that some sentences
might be true, so he must be denying the suggestion that 
those sentences could not be true. We could say that White
appears to be denying that something cannot be true.
Now, who has said that something cannot be true? Well, 
Wittgenstein, in the first landmark, said that certain things
cannot be said— that they make no sense. If you couple 
Wittgenstein's saying this with Ifhite's evident apprehension 
that what Wittgenstein or perhaps his followers) meant was 
that if something cannot be said then it cannot be true, 
then you have White's reason for denying that something can­
not be true. In short. White wants to assert that some things 
can be true.
Now, who else has said that something cannot be true? 
Well, Malcolm, in the "missing ingredient" argument argues
that some things in effect, could not be said, or at least 
that to attempt to say them would result in a misuse of words. 
Once again, if we couple Malcolm's saying this with White's 
apprehension that what Malcolm meant was that if something 
cannot be said then it cannot be true, then you have White's 
reason for holding now against Malcolm that something can be 
true.
Two further appeals to what we would say seem to deliver
the conclusion that something cannot be true: the contrast
argument and the reaction to Austin's plain man. A White-
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style attack fits as a denial of both of these appeals. Re­
call that the contrast argument resembles the other para­
digm case appeal argument, the missing ingredient argument.
Just as we saw a White-style attack on the missing ingredient 
argument, so we will see a corresponding attack on the contrast 
argument. But though the reaction of Austin's plain man 
in some ways resembles Moore's reaction to skepticism, it 
also differs from Moore's reaction. Correspondingly, though 
we did not see a White-style attack on Moore's reaction, we 
shall see an attack against the reaction of the plain man.
It now seems clear that White means to counter an 
appeal to what we would say if the conclusion of that appeal 
suggests that something cannot be true. White will attack 
directly by arguing that it can be true. Of course, his attack 
is relevant only if it was an implication of saying that 
something could not be said, that it could not be true.
It may also be clear that White's reply does not 
fit as a denial of the second landmark, that is, as a denial 
of the remark by Wittgenstein in paragraph 246 that "If we 
are using the word "to know" as it is normally used. . . then 
other people very often know when I am in pain." It is 
no denial of the remark that "Jones is in pain" to charge 
that "It might be true that Jones is in pain." White denies 
only what he sees as implying that something cannot be true, 
and only then, of course, if he thinks that to say it would 
not be illogical.
We see now what kind of appeal a White-style attack is
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against: any appeal that seems to suggest that something
cannot be true. To develop our criticism of a White-style 
attack, we must notice in more detail than in Chapter I the 
complex philosophical use of those appeals that are taken to 
suggest that something cannot be true, in particular, the 
philosophical use of paradigm case appeals. Let's now examine, 
that use.
The Philosophical Use of Paradigm Case Appeals 
There are three main paradigm case appeals: the reac­
tion of Austin's plain man, the missing ingredient argument 
of Malcolm, and the contrast argument of both Malcolm and
Austin. Since our goal is to notice in more detail the complex
philosophical use of these appeals, it will be instructive first 
to review briefly Malcolm's missing ingredient argument, since
Malcolm's argument provides a perspicuous model with which to 
compare other paradigm case arguments. After we review Mal­
colm's argument we will be in a position to notice the complex 
philosophical use of another missing ingredient argument by 
R. M. Hare. It will remain then to examine the use of the 
contrast argument.
Recall Malcolm's criticism of Moore. Moore had claimed 
that there were a number of things that he knew, with cer­
tainty, to be true. For instance, while sitting with Malcolm 
on a bench in front of a tree, Moore had said, "I know that 
that (pointing at the tree) is a tree." Malcolm had argued that 
Moore's statement was a misuse of language, since three ingre­
dients common to the paradigm use of "I know" were missing
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in Moore's use. Recall further the initial stages of 
Malcolm's missing ingredient argument. Malcolm enumerated 
the paradigm uses of "I know", spotted the ingredients common 
to those paradigms, and showed that Moore's use lacked all 
of those ingredients. These initial steps set up the intended 
conclusion: that Moore's use is a misuse.
Now why is this the intended conclusion and not, say, 
that what Moore says "cannot be true?" To understand this, 
we must notice the use of the initial stages to determine 
the only conclusion available to Moore. Moore has just four 
options : (1) He can accept Malcolm's diagnosis of a misuse,
and simply retract his statement, (2) He can accept Malcolm's 
diagnosis of a misuse, but also try to determine why he was 
(and why other philosophers have been) inclined so to misuse 
language, (3) He can reply that in saying "I know" he really 
meant to note that the three ingredients were missing, and
(4) He can urge that he is using "I know" in a special (non­
ordinary) way and thus bypass the concern that his use was a 
misuse. Let's discuss'these four options. It will then be 
easy to see why there are no other options, that is, why it 
is wrong to think that Malcolm has shown that what Moore said 
"cannot be true."
All four options are, of course, given in reaction or 
response to Malcolm's criticism of Moore's initial statement. 
Even though enumerating the paradigm uses of "I know" does 
not require reaction or response to a philosopher, charging 
a misuse of language does. After all, something must be said
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to be a misuse. The question is then whether Malcolm's diag­
nosis of a misuse leaves as a possible conclusion that what 
Moore said "could not be true." To see that it does not, 
consider the four options outlined above.
The first two options concede without qualification 
that it was a misuse. Option one simply retracts that mis­
use of language. Option two uses the misuse of language 
to reveal something about the nature of what philosophers 
say. The second two options concede with qualification 
that it was a misuse. In option three, Moore concedes the 
misuse but restates what he really meant to say in that 
misuse; he really meant to call attention to, say, the 
absence of the ingredient of doubt. Of course, if this is 
all he meant to do, he chose a very awkward and misleading 
way to do so. In option four, Moore concedes the misuse 
but by emphatically characterizing it as an ordinary misuse, 
Moore sets up the picture of the "possibility" that he was 
using "I know" with a special non-ordinary use. Of course, 
as we saw briefly in Chapter I (Pages 35-38), this opens an 
entire, new line of attack. Moore bypasses the charge that 
his use of "I know" was a misuse by "conceding" that if he 
had meant to use it "ordinarily", he would have been mis­
using it but also suggesting that it was a special philoso­
pher's use of words.
Ifhy is it not an option that Malcolm has shown that 
what Moore said "could not be true?" Because these four are 
the only options, and none of them permit that conclusion.
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To see this let's determine whether there is room for any 
other options. First, I shall assume that it is beyond 
dispute that Moore must at least concede, as in option four, 
that his use of "I know" is an "ordinary" misuse. Second, I 
shall assume that no philosopher who retracted his use of 
"I know" because it was a misuse would still insist that never­
theless what he said could be true. Third, I shall take it 
to be obvious that neither Moore nor any other philospher 
would be happy to concede that by saying "I know" he meant 
to call attention to the missing ingredients. If so, then 
after seeing the real meaning of his statement he would not 
continue to insist on saying "I know." More importantly, 
it would be bizarre for him to insist on saying that it 
could be true to say "I know" and mean "the three ingredients 
for saying 'I know' are missing." The only two options 
that seem compatible with the conclusion that "it cannot be 
true" are either that it is an "ordinary" misuse but a special 
(philosophical) use, or that it was simply a misuse but that 
we are still trying to determine why philosophers say such 
things. In the latter case, having conceded that it was a 
misuse, and not knowing why philosophers are even inclined 
to such misuses, one would not insist that in spite of all this 
our misuse of language though not understood could be true.
In summary, we are left only with the possible con­
clusion that when Moore says "I know that that is a tree" he 
is employing the words "I know" with a special philospher's 
use, though with an "ordinary" misuse. Since in Chapter V
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("The Philosophers Use of Words") I argue that Moore’s defense 
is mistaken, I shall now conclude tentatively that it is 
wrong to think that Malcolm has shown that what Moore said 
"cannot be true." Nor does it follow from any possible con­
clusion of Malcolm's work that what Moore said "cannot be 
true." Malcolm has shown what he says he has shown, that 
Moore’s use of "I know" is a misuse.
Moore insists on some singular truths in opposition 
to philosophers who offer universal truths : he insists on
"I know that that is a tree" in opposition to "î^ empirical 
statement can be certain." The use of a paradigm case appeal 
is less dramatic against singular statements like Moore’s than 
against universal statements. R. M. Hare demonstrates this 
more dramatic use when he employs a paradigm-case appeal against 
the universal lament "Nothing matters." Hare’s argument is 
instructive for in it he carefully details the initial stages 
of the appeal, so that it is easy to see the intended conclu­
sion. We will see Hare enumerate the paradigms, spot ingre­
dients common to those paradigms, notice the missing ingre­
dients in the sentence "Nothing matters," and conclude that 
the sentence embodies a kind of misuse of language.
Hare had a young Swiss student visiting him and his 
family at their home in Oxford. The student, after reading 
Camus’s The Stranger, became distraught because, as he ex­
pressed it, "Nothing matters." Hare helped the young man to 
free himself of his despair. To begin the treatment, to enu­
merate the paradigms and spot the common ingredients. Hare
53
involves the young philosopher in his own treatment by asking 
a question:
Like Socrates, I thought that the correct way to 
start my discussion with my Swiss friend was to ask 
what was the meaning or function of the word 'matters' 
in our language; what is it to be important?
He very soon agreed that when we say something matters 
or is important what we are doing, in saying this, is 
to express concern about something. . .
Having secured my friends agreement on this point, I 
then pointed out to him something that followed 
immediately from it. This is that when something 
matters or does not matter, we want to know whose 
concern is being expressed or otherwise referred to.
If the function of the word 'matters' is to express 
concern, and if concern is always somebody's concern, 
we can always ask, when it is said that something 
matters or does not matter, 'Whose c o n c e r n ? '2
The common ingredient is the possibility of asking the question
"Whose concern?" Hare now causes the young philosopher to
hear what he is saying by getting him to hear that the question
"Whose concern?" does not fit with the expression "Nothing
matters."
My friend and I then returned to the remark at the 
end of Camus's novel, and asked whether we really 
understood it. 'Nothing matters' is printed 'on the 
page. So somebody's unconcern for absolutely every­
thing is presumably being expressed or referred to.
But whose ? As soon as we ask this question we see
that there is something funny not indeed about the
remark as made by the character in the novel, in the 
Context in which he is described as making it (though 
there is something funny even about that. . .), but 
about the effect of this remark upon my friend. . .
Why, because an imaginary Algerian prisoner expressed 
unconcern for the world which he was shortly to leave,
R̂. M. Hare, Applications of the Moral Concepts (Ber­
keley: University of California Press, 1972), pages 33-34.
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should my friend, a young Swiss student with the world 
before him, come to share the same sentiments?3
Now that the Swiss student can more clearly hear what he is
saying Hare causes him to face up to it, by suggesting that
on the face of it it is plainly false that nothing matters
to the Swiss student:
I therefore asked him whether it was true that noth­
ing mattered to him. And of course it was not true.
He was not in the position of the prisoner but in 
the position of most of us; he was concerned not 
about nothing but about many things.^
The young Swiss philosopher is left with two options. Either
what he says is not understandable without further explanation,
or it is plainly false.
Now suppose the student were to insist, liko Moore, 
that what he was saying has a special philosphical use, 
though of course it was not understandable in its "ordinary" 
use. The student would bypass the charge that what he says 
is false, but could he insist that what he says could be true? 
Could he reply with White, "Yes, I know that it is inappro­
priate to say that nothing matters, but it still might be 
true." Such a reply would ring hollow, for it would ignore 
or fail to admit to what has already been shown, namely, 
that the sentence "Nothing matters", as uttered by the Swiss 
student, is either not understandable or it is plainly false.
Hare offers some reflections on philosophers who would 
seem to ignore or fail to admit to what has been shown. After
Îbid., pages 35-36. 
^Ibid., page 36.
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helping the student to free himself of his despair. Hare
concludes that philosophers who want to assert that it is
true that nothing matters are even being (existentially) 
hypocriticalI This is not the charge of logical inconsis­
tency, but is the charge that a person is pretending to 
be what he is not, or to feel what he does not feel.
People, who (understanding the words) say that 
nothing matters are, it can be declared, giving
but one example of that hypocrisy or mauvaise foi
which Existentialists are so fond of castigating. . .
You cannot annihilate values— not values as a 
whole.5
If it is hypocritical (existential "bad faith") for the 
student to say that nothing matters, then it would seem also 
to be so for White to insist that it might be true that 
nothing matters.
Is this a serious charge? Well, I do not intend to 
explore the question whether the queer but true critics of 
the appeal to what we would say are (existentially) guilty of 
"bad faith." But I would like to use this example to empha­
size that the use of the missing ingredient argument in 
response to universal statements is quite different from 
arguing that something "cannot be true." It is to awaken 
the philosopher to what he is saying, to cause him to face 
up to it, and then, only then, if it is necessary to put it
this way, to show him that as it stands (on the face of it) 
what he says is plainly false. Since it would be silly to 
argue that something that is plainly false could be true,
^Ibid., page 39.
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the philosopher who opposes the conclusion of the missing 
ingredient argument is left with the hollow response "Though 
it is not understandable it could be true."
To see how hollow is this response, consider, as we 
did with Malcolm’s argument, the four options available to 
the philosopher: (1.) He can concede that "Nothing matters"
is not understandable and simply retract his statement, (2)
He can concede that "Nothing matters" is not understandable 
but try to determine why he felt the need to say it, (3)
He can reply that in saying "Nothing matters" he really meant 
to call attention to the missing ingredient, to the inappli­
cability of the question "Whose concern?", and (4) He can 
urge that he is using "Nothing matters" in a special (non- 
"ordinary") way and thus bypass the charge that his use is 
not understandable.
That there are no other options follows from my assump­
tion that Hare has shown at the very least that the student’s 
use of "Nothing matters" is a misuse and that accordingly it 
is not understandable as a literal expression of what the words 
would suggest as they are normally used. The question is, 
then, whether the words are being used in some special way. 
Since the same reasons would eliminate the first three options 
as eliminated them with Moore, I shall not bother to repeat 
them. Suffice it to say that the only possible option left 
for the opponent.who wants to insist that "Nothing matters" 
could be true, is that he is using the phrase in a special 
way. Though I think it is obvious that this reply shows that
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the philosopher is either pretending to others or deluding 
himself, it really requires the results of Chapter V to draw 
this conclusion. For now, we can at least conclude that 
there seems to be only one reasonable way to respond to a 
paradigm-case treatment and honestly demand that the treated 
sentence could be true.
Missing-ingredient arguments are not the only paradigm- 
case arguments. Philosophers must also face the simple, direct 
power of contrast arguments. Although simple and direct, 
contrast arguments still contain all three ingredients of 
paradigm case appeals. There is an appeal to what we would 
say (to the prominence of paradigms), an argument that with­
out contrast there can be no sense, and a conclusion that a 
sentence cannot be said— that it makes no sense. As we 
examine the contrast arguments in more detail, we want to 
remember our goal. We are trying to get in position to see 
that the initial stages of this kind of paradigm-case argu­
ment determine the intended conclusion that something cannot 
be said, that is, they exclude the conclusion a White-style 
opponent wrongly opposes. Let's now consider three examples 
to emphasize the prominence of paradigms, the argument that 
without contrast there can be no sense, and the conclusion 
that something cannot be said— that it makes no sense.
First, to emphasize the prominence of paradigms, let's 
turn to an argument by Antony Flew. In his recent book Crime 
or Disease?, Flew surveys what he calls the "logical geography" 
necessary to appraise the contention that "All crime is a
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result of mental illness."^ Flew wants to show the difference 
between saying "All crime ^  a result of mental illness" 
and saying "Consider all crime as if it were a result of mental 
illness." Flew argues that the former thesis is more prom­
inent, that is, the paradigm upon which the latter thesis 
is "logically parasitic," To illustrate the prominence of 
the "is" paradigm. Flew offers the following simple analogy:
'It looks to me like a B-52' commits the speaker to 
less than the categorical and unqualified 'It is 
a B-52,* the former is both semantically more so­
phisticated than the latter and logically parasitic 
upon it. You could not, that is to say, understand 
v^at is meant by 'It looks like a B-52' if you did 
not already know the meaning of 'It is a B-52.'7
In general, if Flew is correct, to understand the "looks like" 
expression one must already understand the more prominent 
paradigm, the "is" expression. To the philosopher who wants 
to argue that it is possible for everything to just look 
like something, and never he something. Flew has a response: 
that is not possible— the possibility is not even meaningful. 
Flew could explain how, first, that because of the normal 
contrast of "illusion" with its "opposite" that the philoso­
pher needs to hear what he is saying. Second that after 
hearing it the philosopher would have to face up to what he 
is saying if he means seriously to say something. And third, 
that it would then be obvious that as it stands (on the face 
of it) it would be plainly false to say that everything is an 
illusion. If the philosopher continued to want to say that




everything is an illusion, then he would have to do so with 
the realization that vSiat he wanted to say was not even a 
meaningful possibility.
Has Flew, then, concluded that it "cannot be true" 
that everything is an illusion? Nol Flew has concluded 
that no one could know what is meant by the thesis. Now, 
if no one can know what the thesis means, it would be otiose 
to argue that what one did not know the meaning of might be 
true. For to suggest that Flew has concluded that it "cannot 
be true" would be to suggest that Flew has discovered, by 
analogy, some fact about B-52's that prohibits its being 
known that something is a B-52. Yet no such discovery oc­
casioned Flew's comments. Rather, he is arguing about the 
very intelligibility of what is said.
Second, to emphasize the argument that without contrast
there can be no sense, let's turn to a famous argument by
Gilbert Ryle.
In a country where there is a coinage, false coins 
can be manufactured and passed; and the counter­
feiting might be so efficient that an ordinary 
citizen, unable to tell which were false and which 
were genuine coins, might become suspicious of the 
genuiness of any particular coin that he received.
But however general his suspicions might be, there 
remains one proposition that he cannot entertain, 
the proposition, namely, that it is possible that 
all coins are counterfeits. For there must be an 
answer to the question 'Counterfeits of what?'8
The term 'counterfeit' gets its meaning from a contrast
with its opposite. Thus, since the term is meaningful
QGilbert Ryle, Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge Universi­
ty Press, 1966), pages 94-95.
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one cannot even entertain the "possibility" that all coins 
are counterfeit, for there would be nothing with which to 
contrast the term.
This is not the conclusion that "it cannot be true"
that all coins are counterfeit, for that conclusion would 
suggest that Ryle has made some discovery about the coins in
the country, perhaps he discovered a man who helped to mint 
some of the originals. But no such discovery is even at 
issue. Ryle's conclusion is not about what cannot be true 
but about what cannot even be entertained, let alone, said.
Third, to emphasize the conclusion of a contrast argu­
ment, that a sentence cannot be said or that it makes no 
sense, let's turn to Austin's picturesque description of how 
the philosopher goes awry when that philosopher ignores
contrast. In the "trouser word" argument, Austin has already 
suggested how the philosopher's language can get so far from 
its home that there is no longer any question of whether what 
is said is true. Recall that Austin objects to Ayer's use of
the words "directly perceive."
Now of course what brings us up short here is the 
word 'directly' a favourite among philosophers, 
but actually one of the less conspicuous snakes 
in the linguistic grass. We have here, in fact, 
a typical case of a word, which already has a 
very special use, being gradually stretched, with­
out caution or definition or any limit until it
becomes, first perhaps obscurely metaphorical,
but ultimately meaningless. One can't abuse ordi­
nary language without paying for it.
It is essential to realize that here the notion
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of perceiving indirectly wear the trousers—
'directly' takes whatever sense it has from the 
contrast with its opposite.9
Austin charges that (1) one is awakened ("brought up short")
by Ayer's use of the word "directly," (2) one must face up
to this "less conspicious snake in the philosopher's lin-
guisitic grass," and (3) the word "directly" is ultimately
meaningless since it takes its sense from the contrast with 
its opposite, a contrast that Ayer has stripped away. If any­
one cared to say so, though there would be no point in saying 
so, since it is so obvious, one could say that as it stands 
(on the face of it) what Ayer says is plainly false. And 
if Ayer wanted to charge that it "could be true" that we 
never directly perceive tables, he would need to establish 
the meaning of this special use of words.
When we first discussed the "trouser word" argument 
in Chapter I, we deduced a "guideline" to appraise philoso­
phers ' assertions : determine whether the philosopher has
stretched a word beyond its normal contrast. The primary 
use of this contrast guideline is not to conclude that what 
the philosopher says cannot be true, for that is an after 
effect, and normally could better go without saying. The 
primary use is to awaken the philosopher, to cause him to 
face up to what he says, and then, if he has not caught on, 
to show him that, (to put it in words that he would be more 
likely to understand) as it stands what he says is plainly
^Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, page 15.
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false.
We will see that the philosophers who deliver the 
White-style attack commit one fundamental error: they
wrongly think the conclusion they attack is that something 
cannot be true. Let's now consider a White-style response 
to a paradigm argument.
The Inappropriate Response to a Paradigm Case Appeal
A White-style queer but true attack centers on the 
charge that though a sentence may be inappropriate, if it 
is not illogical it might be true. I shall develop three 
criticisms and a corollary all pivoting around the central 
error. First, the White-style opponents misunderstand the 
use of the appeal as a reaction or a 'response. Second, the 
opponents misunderstand the conclusion either because they 
don't see that the initial stages of the appeal deliver a 
different conclusion or because they unjustifiably impose 
an "excluded middle" option that the only alternatives are 
either that a sentence can be true or it cannot be true.
Third, the White-style opponents ignore the arguments in 
the appeal, attacking instead only its conclusion. Fourth, 
as a corollary we will see that some opponents do not see 
that even if they could establish that a sentence could be 
true, it would not follow that it might be true.
Let's first consider White's ovm attack on certain 
philosophers. Recall White's attack on arguments 1-ike those 
of Malcolm or Wittgenstein. Malcolm had charged that Moore's 
use of "I know" was a misuse. Wittgenstein had charged against
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the Cartesian opponent that "It cannot be said that I know 
I am "in pain." To these appeals to what we would say. White 
counters: "The appropriateness of saying 'I know' must not
be confused with its t r u t h . Elsewhere White repeats the 
challenge:
(It can be a mistake to confuse) what is true to say 
with what it is proper to say . . .(for). . . (there 
is a confusion between) the inappropriateness of say­
ing certain things. . .and the possible truth of such 
things.11
And finally against the analog of Moore's paradox. White 
counters :
(The sentence) "I believe that (Sam robbed the store), 
but he did not," though a queer thing to say, is per­
fectly capable of being quite true.12
White thinks he can counter the appeal to what we would say
by insisting that though queer or inappropriate what is said
might be true.
These quotations display several areas for criticism.
First, White completely ignores the use of the appeal as a
reaction or response to other philosophers. He instead 
attacks what he wrongly takes to be the conclusion of the 
appeal as if that conclusion were offered outside of any
context. Second, by what he offers as a denial. White shows 
what he takes to be the conclusion of the appeal, namely, 
that something cannot be true. We have seen already how
l̂ Modal Thinking, page 31




White's denial fits only as a denial that something cannot 
be true. We have seen also how none of the paradigm-case 
appeals would even permit this kind of conclusion as an 
option. Why then does White misconstrue this to be the 
conclusion?
I think there are two reasons for Wliite*s misunder­
standing. One reason is that he fails to see or ignores 
the initial stages of the appeal. Consider, for example, 
Wittgenstein's two-stage response to ’the Cartesian in para­
graph 246. The Cartesian had claimed that "Only I can 
know whether I am really in pain; another person can only 
surmise it." In the first stage of Wittgenstein's reply he 
tries to get the Cartesian to hear what he is saying and to 
face up to it, for on the face of it, it is plainly false:
"In one way this is wrong. . .if we are using the word 'to 
know' as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), 
then other people very often know when I am in pain." In 
the second stage, Wittgenstein points out to the Cartesian 
opponent that what the Cartesian wants to say cannot even 
be said: "It can't be said of me at all that I know that I 
am in pain." He even adds the suggestion that it would not 
even make sense for me to say it about myself. Without 
further argument, it would be futile for White to reply that 
though it made no sense to say it could be true, for that 
would ignore the initial stages.
The second reason for White's misunderstanding of 
the conclusion is that he unjustifiably imposes an "excluded
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middle" option that the only alternatives are either that a 
sentence either can be true or cannot be true. That White 
sees these as the only alternatives is shown in two ways.
First he insists on the reply "though it is inappropriate 
it can be true." Unless a sentence is illogical, he never 
offers, for example, the reply "it is inappropriate so it is 
neither true nor false." Second, when he interprets his 
"test" to determine whether a sentence is illogical, he sees 
as the only alternative either "illogical" or "not illogical." 
Since he understands this to mean either "cannot be true" or 
"can be true" and since he misconstrues the conclusion of the 
paradigm case appeal as "it cannot be true" then he inter­
prets the failure of something to be illogical as that "it 
can be true."
As I noted White also ignores the arguments offered in 
support of paradigm-case appeals. White nowhere shows the 
contrast or missing ingredient arguments to be mistaken; he 
attacks only what he wrongly believes to be their conclusion. 
But this is no surprise, since he ignores the initial stages 
of the appeals, stages which are, in effect, the premises 
from which the conclusion is deduced. Perhaps White does 
not see that there are arguments. But this comment may be 
unfair, since, if his attack on the conclusion had been suc­
cessful, he would have achieved his goal.
Many philosophers agree with White that an assertion 
can be queer but true unless that assertion is illogical. 
Indeed it seems to be the fashion to give a White-style re-
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sponse almost as if it were an axiom of contemporary philo­
sophy. Two of the most prominent philosophers who seem not 
to question this "axiom" are A. J. Ayer and R. M. Hare. Let's 
consider each of them, in turn, to appreciate the assurance 
with which this axiom is held.
A. J. Ayer agrees with White's queer but true attack. 
Ayer senses that, if properly placed, the contrast argument 
would destroy his brand of skepticism. Accordingly, he fends 
off a contrast appeal. Ayer's reasoning is worth watching, 
for though it is slightly different from White's, it is hard 
to distinguish from White's reasoning. Ayer takes as his foil 
the well-known contrast argument given by Gilbert Ryle. Ayer 
delivers the queer but true challenge against Ryle's contrast 
argument. Recall that Ayer is eager to defend the philoso­
phical view that "No empirical statement can be known to be 
certain." Taking a statement about "perception", to be an 
example of an empirical statement, Ayer tries to fend off 
the contrast argument that just as it is not possible that 
all coins are counterfeit, so it is not possible that "All 
perception is illusory."
The fact that this type of scepticism is so undis- 
criminating in its scope, that it rains alike on the just 
and the unjust, has been thought to expose it to an easy 
refutation. Just as, to use a simile of Ryle's, 'there 
can be false coins only where there are coins made of the 
proper material by the proper authorities", so it is argued 
there can be times when our senses deceive us only if there 
are times when they do not. A perception is called illu­
sory by contrast with other perceptions which are veridi­
cal: therefore to maintain that all perceptions must be
illusory would be to deprive the word 'illusory' of its 
meaning.
This argument is not decisive. It is true that no
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judgements of perception would be specially open to 
distrust unless some were trustworthy; but this is not 
a proof that we cannot be mistaken in trusting those 
that we do. Even granting that it makes no sense to 
say that all of our perceptions are delusive any one 
of them still may be. . . From the fact that our re­
jection of some of them is grounded on our acceptance 
of others it does not follow that those that we 
accept are true.
Even though it is queer (makes no sense to say) that all
perceptions are delusive (illusory?) still any one of our
perceptions may be delusive. Ayer seems to use the queer-
but-true attack that we have seen White give.
But there is one slight difference.Ayer does not con­
clude that all our perceptions may be delusive, he only 
concludes that anyone of them may be delusive. In one way 
Ayer is correct and in another way Ayer shows a worse mis­
understanding than White's.
Ayer is correct that the contrast argument does not 
prove that "we cannot be mistaken in trusting those that we 
do," or that "those we accept are true." But in suggesting 
that it was the intention to prove such a conclusion, Ayer 
betrays a misunderstanding of the contrast argument. The 
contrast argument is not offered as a "proof" that "these 
coins in my hand are genuine." Rather it is offered in 
reaction or response to the suggestion that it is possible 
that all coins are counterfeit. Its conclusion is what 
Ryle says it is, "that possibility cannot even be entertained." 
In appealing to paradigm uses of words to set up a paradigm-
l^A.J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge (Baltimore: Pen­
guin Books, 1966) pages 37-38 (emphasis mine).
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case argument, a philosopher does not "prove" that what he 
is saying is true.^^ No such question is at issue.
R. M. Hare's misunderstanding is not as great as 
Ayer's. It may seem ironic that Hare would accept this 
"axiom" of contemporary philosophy, since Hare himself offered 
one of our most dramatic paradigm-case arguments. To see 
Hare's most recent view, consider the following contrast 
argument: "One cannot say (and hence it cannot be true?) 
that a fire engine looks red, if one is standing flat in 
front of it in broad daylight, and one knows it to be red.
For, to say that it looks red is to suggest that there is 
some contrast with its being red or with your not knowing 
whether it is red. Now, if it is red and you know it 
is red, then what sense can it make to say 'It looks red'?"
Hare's reply to this argument is unequivocal. He 
concedes the inappropriateness of saying "It looks red" 
but does not surrender its possible truth. He even applies 
White's Test for being illogical, or as Hare says, incon­
sistent:
Here, as in so many other places in philosophy, it is 
very important to distinguish between things which it 
would be ridiculous, inapposite, inappropriate, or 
even misleading to say, and things which would be false 
or incomprehensible or inconsistent.
Historically, this misunderstanding has trailed those 
who offer paradigm case arguments. One well-known version 
of this misunderstanding is supplied by John Passmore: "Then 
we are to conclude that there must be 'ghosts' since, again, 
people know how to use that word correctly?" (Excluded Oppo­
sites and Paradigm Cases," Philosophical Reasoning (New York: 
Basic Books, 1969), page 113.
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It is only when it would be false or incomprehensible 
or inconsistent to say something that philosophers 
would be professionally interested.
For example, it has been correctly maintained that, 
in a normal case, to say of something "It looks red" 
when one knows it to ^  red is to speak misleadingly, 
and that such a remark is inapposite and inappropriate.
But not so much can be argued from this as has been 
thought. . .For, though misleading and inappropriate, 
it may be perfectly comprehensible and indeed true to 
say of a thing which one knows to be red that it looks red.
And while there may not be any point, on most occasions, 
in saying •It both looks and is red’, it is not incon­sistent or incomprehensible.
It could not be said more clearly, nor could it seem more 
correct. Something might very well be true even though it 
was inappropriate to assert. Hare even shows that the 
conjunction of the assertion and the statement that one of 
its conditions is not satisfied, is not illogical. For, to 
assert appropriately that it looks red, philosophers would 
normally suggest that one precondition might be that it not 
be red. The statement of the unsatisfied condition would 
be, then, the statement that it is red. If we conjoin 
"It looks red" with "it is red" we get the not inconsistent 
(not illogical) assertion "It looks red and is red." Hare 
obviously agrees with White's queer but true attack that 
though an assertion may be inappropriate, if it is illo­
gical it might be true.
Hare's reply would fit Flew's B-52 example. For Hare 
seems to have forgotten the prominence of the paradigm "is"
15R. I'l. Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Oxford Uni­
versity Press, 1977), pages 58-59 (my divisions and emphasis).
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statement. To say of something that it ^  red would make 
no sense if one were also to say that it looks red. Hare 
seems to ignore the initial stages of the appeal that show 
its use as a reaction or response to Q^er philosophers.
Hare has also fallen into the trap of thinking that 
if a sentence is not inconsistent (not illogical) then it 
"could be true." Hare even says "it may be indeed true."
In the next chapter I shall consider the faulty inference 
from "not illogical" to "could be true", but for now I 
want to emphasize once again the fundamental error of 
thinking that the conclusion of the appeal is that some­
thing could not be true. Hare's reply shows that he makes 
this error. He probably even draws this conclusion for the 
same two reasons as White: (1) he forgets the initial stages
of the appeal that establish its use as a reaction, and (2) 
he imposes an excluded middle option. Hare appears to impose 
the excluded middle option when he interprets the "not in­
consistent" as meaning "could be true". Evidently he sees 
no further option for a sentence.
Finally, notice that Hare has ignored the arguments 
for the conclusion of the appeal. As with Ifhite, this may 
be because he misses the initial stages, or it may be because 
he thinks that he can successfully attack what he (wrongly) 
thinks to be the conclusion. In either case, since his 
attack on the conclusion fails, he is left with no further 
attack. The arguments (contrast and missing ingredient) now 
are left unchallenged.
71
Ayer and Hare agree with î̂ hite, and of course many 
other contemporary philosophers, that though something is 
queer to say it still might be true. This fashionable attack 
on the appeal to what we would say at first seems correct.
How, after all, could one show that something could not 
be true, by just examining what we would say? Surely, this 
is how Tfhite, Ayer, and Hare would put the question. But I 
have argued that these philosophers misconstrue the special 
philosophical use of the appeal to what we would say. They 
do not understand that the use is not to establish what 
cannot be true, but, rather, to get the philosopher who is 
the target to hear what he is saying, to force him to face 
up to what he is saying, and to show him that as it stands 
(on the face of it) it is either plainly false or is trivial.
An Objection and a Corollary
But one may object that I have used in my arguments 
the very appeal that I am defending. Or, to put it cryptically, 
is it not true that "It can be true"? However odd, inappro­
priate, or misconceived it may be to say so, has not White 
shown that, for example, since it is not illogical to assert 
that "I believe that Sam robbed the store but he did not" 
that therefore, it can be true that "I believe that Sam robbed 
the store but he did not?" Well, if I may put it this way, 
"Yes," "No," and "It does not matter anyway."
The "Yes" and "No" answer I shall discuss in Chapter
Three when we more carefully examine the two ways of showing 
that something can be illogical to say. But why does it
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not matter? To see why, consider the assertions that are 
made credible by the queer-but-true attacks on the appeal to 
what we would say.
If White is correct that some assertions, though inap­
propriate, can be true, then we want to know which assertions 
are thereby made credible. Ayer was criticized by Malcolm 
for the assertion "No empirical statement can be certain." 
Ayer was again criticized by Austin for the assertion "Such 
objects as pens and cigarettes are never directly perceived." 
Wittgenstein's Cartesian opponent was criticized for the 
assertion "Only I can know whether I am in pain, another 
person can only surmise it." So, Ayer and Wittgenstein's 
Cartesian opponent are (among) the indirect beneficiaries 
of White's attack.
To see more clearly how these are the indirect 
beneficiaries, consider the case of Wittgenstein's Cartesian 
opponent. Recall that, in paragraph 246, the Cartesian 
asserts that "Only I can know whether I am in pain, another 
person can only surmise it." To this, Wittgenstein replies, 
in part, "It cannot be said of me at all that I know that 
I am in pain." If Wittgenstein is stopped from his reply 
by a White-style attack, then the Cartesian is the benefi­
ciary. For, the only thing stopping the Cartesian is Witt­
genstein's insistence that an assumption of the Cartesian 
is mistaken, namely, that it "can be said" that he knows he 
is in pain.
White, then, insists on the possible truth of the
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assertions made by Wittgenstein's Cartesian opponent and by 
Ayer. But suppose it could be true that, say, "I know that 
I am in pain." Would the Cartesians' skepticism be revived?
I think the answer to this question is that though the Car­
tesian (or Ayer) might think so, it really would not be 
revived. Hence, even if it could be true that I know that I 
am in pain, it would not matter anyway; skepticism would 
not have been revived.
To understand this line of reasoning, consider what 
would revive the skepticism. Showing that there was some 
good reason to believe^Êhat "I know that I am in pain" or 
that "No empirical statement is certain" would revive it. 
Unfortunately, White uses words that suggest just thatI 
He says that though it is inappropriate to say, it still 
might be true.
The word "might" is dangerous because it can suggest 
more than White has shown. Suppose that we grant that White 
has shovm that an expression is not illogical and that we 
can then say of that expression that it could be true.
From this it does not follow that it might be true. To see 
this, consider the well-known example of humans getting 
sick. Since I am human I can (could) get (be) sick, but 
that does not cause me constantly to worry that I might
^Ggome philosophers may wish to argue that this assump­
tion, as they say, "begs the question." If so, I should 
be happy to console myself with the "worry" that though 
there is no good reason to believe that I am wrong, say, 
still it "may" be true that I am.
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(may) actually be sick. My being human, and hence the pos­
sibility for me to get sick does not in any way (since I 
am not a hypochrondriac) give me any reason to consider that 
I might be sick, to consider doubting ray health. Only if 
a hypochrondriac*s view were the model for skepticism would 
we accept the argument that since an expression could be 
true, that therefore it might be true. Skepticism is not 
revived.
Unfortunately, many philosophers do not accept this 
argument. They believe that if an expression could be true, 
that it might be true, though of course they would not ex­
press it quite in that way. Ayer, for example, thinks that 
a skepticism that is even just logically possible is a skep­
ticism to be dealt with.^' Other philosophers, of course, 
share that view. It remains to show, then, that the queer 
but true attacks on the appeal to what we would say do not 
even deliver logical possibility. For, White's Test to 
determine which assertions are not illogical does not de­
liver what he thinks it does. To see that, we must turn 
to the argument that enables one to determine whether a 
White conjunctive sentence is not illogical, Dretske's 
"Shift" argument.
^^Ayer^ The Problem of Knowledge, pages 38-40,
CHAPTER III
THE SHIFT
Fred I. Dretske provides a test to determine whether 
something that is said can be true; just "shift" the tense 
or person of what is said. If what is "shifted" can be 
true, then the original can be true. Coupled with White's 
test for not being illogical, this produces a test to de­
termine whether a conjunctive sentence is not illogical: 
just "shift" the tense or person of the conjunctive sen­
tence. If the "shifted" conjunctive sentence is not 
illogical, then the original conjunctive sentence is not 
illogical. If a,sentence that is not illogical is a sentence 
that can be true, then it would follow that the original sen­
tence could be true.
' We saw in Chapter II that White's "inappropriate but
true" attack depends upon the premise that the sentence can
be true (is not illogical). And that, furthermore, because
he misconstrues the use of the appeal to what we would say.
White wrongly thinks that the main point of the appeal is to 
show what cannot be true. Nevertheless, let's assume that
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is the point of the appeal to what we would say. For we
now want to know whether a White-style attack on the appeal
delivers what Ifhite thinks it does; does it deliver a sentence 
that is not illogical— a sentence that can be true?
I shall argue that a White-style attack on the appeal 
to what we would say does not deliver what White thinks it
does; it does not deliver a sentence that can be true. Two 
main difficulties will emerge: One, Dretske's shift does not
work, and, two. White's restricted notion of a sentence's 
being "not illogical" bars him from his desired conclusion.
It will remain to show in Chapter IV that Dretske and tvhite 
fail because they wrongly believe they need to radically 
divide conditions for assertion from conditions for truth.
But this belief will be shown to be built upon a mistake.
Hence, there will be no reason to accept a White-style attack 
on the appeal to what we would say. But first, let's examine 
Dretske's shift argument.
Exposition of Dretske's Shift
Dretske presents his argument to show that one ought 
not "to confuse truth implications with utterance implica­
tions."^ Before actually considering the shift itself, 
let's get clear on what one ought not to confuse. Dretske 
says that if someone ("S") says that something is the case, 
then there is a distinction between the following two sorts 
of implications :
Truth Implications : Q is a truth utterance implication of S's statement it S's statement would not be true unless Q were true.
^Dretske, Seeing and Knowing, page 35.
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Utterance Implications ; Q is an utterance implication of 
S's statement if S would not, normally, have made the state 
ment unless Q were true.^
In the same passage Dretske adds that this distinction re­
flects the difference we feel between "what he said implies" 
and "his saying that implies." To take an example, consider 
White's saying that "Sam did not rob the store." Ifhite's 
saying that implies that he believes that Sam did not rob 
the store, although what he said ("Sam did not not rob 
the store") does not, by itself, imply that White believes 
that Sam did not rob the store. So, that White believes 
it is an utterance implication not a truth implication. To 
further support this distinction, Dretske argues that if, 
contrary to the utterance implication. White believes that 
Sam did rob the store, then that would not show that Ifhite ' s 
statement was false, "it would tend to show, however, that 
his statement went wrong in other ways (deceitful?).He now 
draws the connection with a White-style" inappropriate but 
true" attack:
Generally speaking, the failure of an utterance im­
plication to be satisfied earns for the statement 
such epithets as 'misleading' 'inappropriate', 'be­
sides the point', 'ironic', and 'deceitful'.4
That a statement is inappropriate is, then, an utterance
implication, not a truth implication. Dretske agrees with





to say or to utter, still it could be true.
Since it is Dretske* s concern to determine which 
assertions are true, he presents the shift argument to 
determine whether the gueerness of a sentence results from 
an unsatisfied utterance condition or from an unsatisfied
truth condition. If the shifted sentence can be true, then, 
Dretske will conclude, the queerness of the sentence was not 
due to an unsatisfied truth condition; the sentence, however 
inappropriate, can be true.
Dretske illustrates the "shift" on the sentence "I 
see a bus approaching, but I do not believe a bus is approach­
ing. "
Whereas it is paradoxical to say, 'I see a bus approach­
ing, but I do not believe a bus is approaching*. . .it 
is quite routine to say, *1 saw a bus, but, at the time 
did not know what it was', or 'He sees the bus but cannot 
make out what it is.'
Thus as soon as the tense, or the person, of the report 
is shifted the possibilities for confusion (about the 
report's being odd to say and its being true) diminish 
considerably.*
However inappropriate it may be to say "I see a bus approach­
ing but I do not believe a bus is approaching," it still
can be true.
If we add White's thesis to Dretske's argument the 
resulting argument has the following structure:
1. If it can be true of me, then it can be true for me to say^
^Ibid., page 37.
Î shall occasionally use the odd sounding locution 
"true (for me) to say" as short for the more cumbersome 
"if I were to say it, what I would say could be true." The 
purpose of this is to call attention to the difference missed 
by those who give the shift argument.
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2, It can be true of me, because it is not illogical. 
Therefore, it can be true for me to say.
That it can be true of me is shown either by shifting tense
and saying it of myself, or by shifting person and having
someone else say it of me. White provides the argument for
the second premise; he argues with the conjunctive test 
that it is not illogical to say of me, so it can be true 
of me. Taking the premises in order let's examine their 
support.
Criticism of Dretske's Shift
In support of premise 1, that if something can be true 
of me it can be true for me to say, Dretske gives a double 
argument. First he gives an excluded middle argument that 
since it is not false it is true; second, he suggests that 
since it is true the only thing to keep me from thinking 
it is not true for me to say is my failure to see that only 
an utterance condition can block its sense. But that does 
not preclude its still being true (however inappropriate) 
to say. We will consider the second of these arguments in 
Chapter IV. For now, let's examine the first.
Excluded Middle
Dretske presents this argument in many places through­
out his book. Consider the following selection. Dretske 
is attacking Norwood Russell Hanson who argues that it is 
hard to know "how to regard a man's report that he sees an 
X  if we know him to be ignorant of all x-ish things.
^Dretske, page 37.
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Hanson's answer, which Dretske quotes in the same passage, 
is that we would regard the man's report "precisely as we 
would regard a four-year old's report that sees a meson 
shower. . . (to take another example). . .to see an X-ray 
tube is at least to see that, if it dropped on stone, it 
would smash."
Dretske replies to Hanson's suggestion by suggesting
that the only two options are either that he does see x or
he does not see x:
Does this mean that he does not see that which it would 
be puzzling for him to say he sees? It would also be 
puzzling in the same way, if this man said he was stand­
ing next to an X .  Does this mean the man is not stand­
ing next to an X ? .  . .Certainly X-ray tubes can be seen 
by four-year olds, and not just well-informed four-year 
year olds. Why should they not see them? Are they in­
visible? Does the four-year old see through them?8
Dretske believes that one good -reason for saying that it
is true that a child does see an X-ray tube is that we could
not say that he does not see an X-ray tube. And so, by
analogy, since when I am in pain we don't want to say that I
do not know it, surely we must say that I ^  know it. And if
we don't want to say that "the fire engine does not look red,
then we must say that it does look red. Just as we would
surely not want to say of Moore that he does not know that
that's a tree, so we must say that Moore does know that that's
a tree.
We saw that this "excluded middle" view led White to 
choose to say that something can be true, since he did not
Gibid.
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want to allow that it cannot be true. This excluded middle 
view also appears to lie at the heart of the trouble with 
queer but true attacks on the appeal to what we would say.
It certainly lies at the heart of Dretske's defense of his 
first premise.
To support the premise that "If it can be true of me, 
then it can be true for me to say "Dretske argues that it 
must be true for me to say; for, if it can be true of me, 
then surely it cannot be false for me to say. How could 
it be true of me that I know that that’s a tree, but false 
for me to say that I know that that's a tree ?
Now what is wrong with this agrument? First recall 
what the argument is designed to show. It is designed to 
show that Dretske's first premise is correct (that if some­
thing can be true of me then it can be true for me to say) . 
Second, recall what it is designed to oppose. The claim 
that "It can be true for me to say something" is designed 
to oppose the (wrongly supposed) conclusion of the appeal 
to what we would say, that •"It cannot be true for me to say 
something." Third, recall that the sentence "It cannot be 
true" is misunderstood by White (and now, evidently, Dretske) 
to mean "It must be false." Fourth, it now follows that in 
wrongly assuming that the only choices are "it can be true" 
and "it must be false," Dretske and White, by that assumption 
exclude the very option that is the real conclusion of the 
appeal to what we would say; they exclude the option that 
the truth or falsity of what is said does not even arise, since
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the words of the assertion do not apply (are inappropriate).
An imaginary exchange may make this objection clearer. 
Imagine a skeptic rock-hound who, overcome with his interest 
and love for his prey, wants to argue that we can never know 
for certain whether rocks think. By appealing to what we 
would say, we might try to get the skeptic to hear, and to
face up to, what he was suggesting. (We might ask, "How can
you bear to take the baby rocks from their mothers?") Now, 
the skeptic, in trying to classify the treatment that had 
just been (unsuccessfully) worked upon him, might reply,
"All right, so you think that rocks cannot think. If I may 
be allowed to quote the eminent A. J. Ayer. . ." (I inter­
rupt him). . ."Stop'. I did not say that rocks cannot
think." He now turns to his friend Dretske; "Jones thinks 
rocks can think." Frustrated, I reply: "It is neither
that they can think nor that they cannot think." Astounded 
but secretly intrigued, he patronizes me: "I never did
understand you Wittgensteinans, anyway." Now, finally, I can 
agree with him.
Just as it is neither that a rock can think nor 
that it cannot think, so it is neither that I can know that 
I am in pain nor that I cannot know that I am in pain; so, 
also, it is neither that the fire engine does look red, nor 
that it does not look red; and, so, finally, it is neither 
that I do know that that's a tree, nor that I do not know that 
that's a tree. It is unfair to reply to the appeal to what 
we would say, by excluding by assumption the very conclusion
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of the appeal. Dretske's first premise that "If it can 
be true of me, then it can be true for me to say" stands 
unsupported.
Narrow Use of "Not Illogical"
?Jhat about the second premise, that "It can be true 
of me because it is not illogical"? I should like to argue 
that if by "can" White means "not illogical," then if there 
is no equivocation on the word "can" in premises 1 and 2,
White's argument is oversimplified. For it oversimplifies 
the situation to explain that it is "not illogical" for one 
to say "I believe that Sam robbed the store but he did not."
I shall argue, then, that White's narrow notion of what is 
"not illogical" causes him to oversimplify not just the
second premise itself but its role in the argument as a 
whole.
One must tread carefully here, for the surface is 
very thin. I do not mean to go into all the depths of what 
it means or does not mean to be illogical. My sole aim is 
to present a case that will, I think, show that White’s use 
of "not illogical" is too restricted, and hence oversimpli­
fied.
Let me first allow Wittgenstein to present my case. 
Wittgenstein had just attended a philosophy meeting at which 
Moore first introduced what is now known as "Moore's Paradox." 
It is, of course similar enough to the paradox we have been 
considering that conclusions about Moore's Paradox may apply 
to the "Sam's robbery" paradox. Wittgenstein, in this 1944
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letter to Moore, recalls the paper Moore had read just one 
day before:
I should like to tell you how glad I am that you read 
us a paper yesterday. It seems to me that the most im­
portant point was the 'absurdity* of the assertion 'There 
is a fire in this room and I don't believe there is.' 
Pointing out that 'absurdity' which is in fact something 
similar to a contradiction, though it isn't one, is so 
important that I hope you'll publish your paper. By the 
way, don't be shocked at my saying it's something 
'similar' to a contradiction. . .The assertion has to 
be ruled out and is ruled out by 'common sense,' just 
as a contradiction is. And this just shows that logic 
isn’t as simple as logicians think it is. In particular: 
that contradiction isn't the unique thing people think 
it is. It isn't the only logically inadmissible form 
and it is, under certain circumstances, admissible.
And to show this seems to me the chief merit of your 
paper.9
Just as it could be said to be "illogical" to assert "There 
is a fire in this room and I don't believe there is" so it 
could be argued that it is "illogical" to say "Sam robbed 
the store but I don't believe it."
Let's consider one such argument. We can use Dretske's 
distinction between utterance and truth implications to make 
this point. Consider that to say "Sam robbed the store" is 
to imply that you believe that Sam robbed the store, and that 
to say "I don't believe it" is to imply that you do not be­
lieve it. If we conjoin the two implications, we have that 
you're saying "Sam robbed the store but I don't believe it" 
implies the contradictory conjunction "I believe that Sam 
robbed the store and I do not believe that Sam robbed the store.
^Garth Hallett, A Companion to Wittgenstein's Investi­
gations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), page 656.
lOstephen E. Toulmin seem to agree. When arguing a 
similar paradox, he suggests that "to say it is a 'contradic­
tion,' is another question. . .though I think a strong case 
could be made for calling it one." (Toulmin, "Probability," 
Essays in Conceptual Analysis, page 167.)
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Now we have two arguments to choose between. Dretske 
tells us that if you shift the sentence, then it is not con­
tradictory. The argument we have just seen tells us that if 
you say the sentence then you will contradict yourself. How 
do we choose between these two options? I don't think we need 
to. We can both agree with Dretske that ^  you shift the 
sentence the new shifted sentence is not contradictory and 
also maintain that if you should say the original sentence
you would contradict yourself. But it is clear that if we 
had to choose, we should not choose Dretske's argument, for 
it is one more step removed from our concern, the original 
sentence. It would be to choose to contradict oneself with 
the "distant assurance" that what you were saying wasn't 
really contradictory. Dretske's argument must give way.H
This can, perhaps, help us to see that to think as White
Would Wittgenstein agree? I don't think Wittgenstein 
was even aware of the shift as a form of argument. I think 
a fair case can be made out that he vacillated between ray say­
ing something of nyself and someone saying it of me (But 
there is probably plenty of evidence to the contrary). It 
is interesting to note that curious possibility that in para­
graph 24 6 he was not even talking about my saying of myself 
I know I am in pain. As evidence that Wittgenstein stumbled 
onto the shift very late in his career, and even then did 
not seem to recognize what he had stumbled over, note the 
following series of passages from On Certainty; "(From 353)
If a forester goes into a wood with his men and says 'This
tree has got to be cut down, and this one and this one' what
if he then observes 'I know that that's a tree. . .? But might 
I not say of the forester 'He knows that that's a tree (my 
emphasis). . .(From 397) Haven't I gone wrong and isn't Moore 
perfectly right?. . .And don't I know that there is no stair­
way in this house going six floors deep into the earth, even 
though I have never thought about it?. . . (From 400) Here I 
am inclined to fight windmills, because I cannot yet say the 
thing I really want to say."
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does that Sam's paradox is clearly not "illogical" is to 
reveal the view that those things are illogical only that 
are themselves contradictory. This conceals two narrow con­
cerns: (1) the only way to be illogical is to be contradic­
tory, and (2) the only significant philosophical way to be 
contradictory is for a sentence itself to be contradictory.
We have seen the fault of the second concern, how in a shifted 
sentence it must give way to the notion of contradicting one­
self. The first concern is also faulty, as an examination 
of the use of the word "illogical"/would easily show. To 
the objector who would reply that^examining the use of the 
word "illogical" would be irrelevant to White's concern, that 
when White uses the word "illogical" he uses it in the sense 
of a formal contradiction, I should reply that the objector 
has thereby made my case; White's use is too narrow for the 
task at hand.
As a final criticism of White's narrow use of "not illo­
gical" I should simply like to point out that White seems to 
impose an "excluded middle" view of being "not illogical".
He seems to hold that there are only two options : either a
sentence is illogical or it is not illogical. Now this results 
primarily from his using the words "not illogical" very 
narrowly, for he excludes those peculiar (or perhaps common) 
sentences that could not properly be said either to be illo­
gical or not to be illogical. Now since the main interest 
in this particular part of philosophy lies in the border­
line and fringe areas, it is fair to charge that White employs
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an oversimplified notion of being "not illogical". His tools 
are too crude for the delicate task.
There are then two main difficulties with the "shift" 
argument when it is coupled with White's Test. First, the 
conclusion is not required to be true since the initial 
premise is not shown to be true— it is unsupported. Second, 
insofar as the second premise may betray a faulty, because 
forced, notion of what is to count as "not illogical", then . 
either the argument may be an equivocation or it does not 
deliver what it was designed to deliver, namely that certain 
sentences though inappropriate could be true.
Nevertheless a stalwart opponent of the appeal to what 
we would say may insist that this is all for naught. For 
the "real" explanation of the supposed "illogical" paradox 
is that we have been confusing the conditions for saying 
something with the conditions for its truth. It remains 
to show that that view, also, is fraught with difficulty, 
since it is built upon a mistake. We turn now to what may 
appear to be the last attempt to salvage the White-style 




John R. Searle drives a wedge between assertion and 
truth. He argues that it would be a mistake to suppose that 
"the conditions in which it is correct to assert (I believe 
that Sam robbed the store but he did not) are identical with 
the conditions in which it is the case that (I believe that 
Sam robbed the store but he did not)".  ̂ He argues further that 
by looking at the conditions under which it would be correct 
to assert the robbery paradox, we might commit the assertion 
fallacy:
Assertion Fallacy: The assertion fallacy. . . is the fallacy
of confusing the conditions for the performance of the speech 
act of assertion with the analysis of the meaning of parti­
cular words occurring in certain assertions.2
So if we are attempting to understand the concept of belief, 
we might be mistaken to look (only) at conditions for assert­
ing, say, the robbery paradox.
^John R. Searle, "Assertions and Aberrations," 
emphasis).
^Searle, Speech Acts, page 141.
88
89
Relation to Previous Findings 
Searle's diagnosis seems to confirm lihite's and 
Dretske's positions, however unsupported they may seem, that 
though a sentence can be inappropriate to assert it can still 
be true. For, his diagnosis would suggest that since the 
conditions for assertion could differ from the conditions for 
truth, then the conditions for asserting the robbery paradox 
could differ from the conditions for its truth. Though it 
is queer to say, it could be true.
Now, we have seen this claim before. White argued 
that a sentence though inappropriate could be true. Dretske 
argued that an utterance though inappropriate could be true. 
And Moore argued, in his letter to Malcolm, that though what 
he said might be, in a way, senseless could be true. We have 
also seen the misunderstandings that a philosopher may betray 
when he insists upon these statements. First, the philospher 
probably misunderstands the proper use of the appeal to what 
we would say. Second, the philosopher may subscribe to a nar­
row notion of what is to count as "not illogical." Third, 
the philosopher may exclude by assumption the very position 
that (he may not realize) he is arguing against.
But a stalwart critic of the appeal to what we would 
say may insist that this is all for naught, for the "real" 
explanation of what seem to be misunderstandings is that the 
proponents of the appeal to what we would say have been con­
fusing the conditions for saying something with the conditions 
for its truth. In response to the first supposed misunder-
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standing that the use of the appeal has been misunderstood, 
the critic of the appeal may retort that it is its very 
use that he criticizes for it causes philosophers to look 
at what we would assert rather that what might be true. In re­
sponse to the second alleged misunderstanding the critic 
may retort that of course there may be interesting conflicts 
and paradoxes in a logic of assertion but that the logic 
would be just that, a logic of assertion. And to the third 
charged misunderstanding, the critic may retort that it is 
not that he has excluded by assumption the intended con­
clusion but that he can in fact show that the intended con­
clusion is mistaken; namely, he can show it the assertion 
fallacy. We must consider the assertion fallacy.
I shall argue that to charge the proponents of the 
appeal to what we would say with the assertion fallacy is 
(1) to misunderstand the appeal, and (2) to be flat wrong, 
if the charge is to make possible certain queer first-person 
indicative assertions.
Exposition of Searle's Charge
In his paper "Assertions and Aberrations." Searle 
charges that such philosophers as Wittgenstein, Austin and 
Malcolm all think that the meaning of a word is its use, 
and that they look to the use of certain words (such 
as "know") in only simple categorical indicative s e n t e n c e s . ^
So we have, for example, Wittgenstein wondering about the
^John Searle, "Assertions and Aberrations", pages 217-218
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use of "to know" in simple sentences such as "I know that 
I am in pain*" Now since according to Searle those philoso­
phers consider primarily assertions and not (say) questions 
or commands, they might be mistaking a supposed discovery 
about knowledge a discovery about what it is to make an. 
assertion.
Searle even gives a further diagnosis of this poten­
tial mistake. He says the real reason we don't say "I know
that I am in pain" is that it is normal that if you are in
pain you know it. It is a point, he says, about assertion,
not knowledge, that one does not make an assertion about
4what is standard or normal. We could reword this thesis 
to say that to make an assertion is to suggest by making 
it (not in what is asserted) that there is something not 
standard or normal. This would then be what Dretske called 
an "utterance implication." According to Dretske, my saying 
something may have implications that are not identical with 
the implications of what is said.
We have, then, a simple and seemingly correct explana­
tion for the inappropriateness of Moore's assertion "I know 
that that's a tree." It is inappropriate because if while sit­
ting on a bench in front of a tree, there is nothing out of the 
ordinary, nothing non-normal, then there is no reason to make 
the assertion "I know that that's a tree"-though, and this 
is the part that we're interested in, it still could be true 
(since it true). It seems simple, and it seems correct.
^Ibid., page 212.
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Criticisms of Searle’s Charge
I shall present three main criticisms of Searle’s 
charge. First, Searle makes the illicit assumption that 
Wittgenstein (and presumably other philosophers) were 
"analyzing the meanings of certain words." This assump­
tion shows a misunderstanding of the appeal to what we would 
say. Second, Searle xinjustifiably imposes an excluded 
middle option in two ways; he makes the now familiar assump­
tion that if something cannot be said it follows that it can­
not be true, and he says that "since the possibility of 
something's being false is not in the offing"^ then it is 
true (hence, could be true). Third, Searle's conclusion that 
certain first person indicative assertions can be true is 
flat wrong. It seems to rely on a faulty "shift" argument.
Analyzing Meaning?
Was Wittgenstein (and were Austin and Malcolm) 
"analyzing the meaning of certain words?" Searle's descrip­
tion betrays two familiar misunderstandings of the use of 
the appeal to what we would say : a failure to appreciate the
initial stages, and a related failure to understand the in­
tended conclusion. We have seen the use of the initial stages 
to get a philosopher to hear what he is saying, to get him 
to face up to what he is saying, and, in case of universal 
statements, to get him to hear that what he is trying to say 
is, on the face of it, plainly false. These procedures are
^Ibid., page 213.
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not to analyze the meaning of words but to recall and 
announce those meanings, to help philosophers get their 
bearings. Consider again Wittgenstein's treatment of his 
Cartesian opponent in paragraph 246. Is Wittgenstein analyz­
ing the meaning of "to know" in this paragraph? What a mis­
leading way to put itI Wittgenstein deftly combines the first 
two stages in an attempt to help the Cartesian see his errors.
He gets the Cartesian to hear what he is saying be flatly 
observing that "other people very often know when I am in 
pain." And the Cartesian does begin to hear; for he replies 
to Wittgenstein: "Yes, but all the same not with the cer­
tainty with which I know it myself 1" How Wittgenstein forces 
the Cartesian really to face up to what he is saying, by de­
claring "It cannot be said of me at all that I know I am 
in pain." This is not analyzing the meaning of certain words; 
this is the treatment of an errant Cartesian.
Not only does Searle's assumption demonstrate that he 
fails to see or ignores the initial stages of the appeal to 
what we would say, but it also demonstrates that Searle fails 
to understand the stated conclusion: that something cannot
be said. Searle shows this misunderstanding in his desire to 
combat the conclusion he wrongly thinks Wittgenstein has tried 
to show. In Searle's he is combatting the conclusion that some­
thing cannot be true. But, of course, what Wittgenstein said 
was that something cannot be said, not that something cannot 
be true. Well, didn't Wittgenstein really mean "cannot be 
true ?" Clearly he did notl For, given the significance of
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this passage and given his repeated use of the expression 
"cannot be said", it is reasonable to assume that if he meant 
not "cannot be said" but rather "cannot be true" then he 
would have written "cannot be true." Now, with some authors 
and some passages this defense may seem presumptuous, but 
with Wittgenstein and paragraph 246 this defense is not pre­
sumptuous, it is deserved.
Well, if it cannot be said, doesn’t it follow that 
it cannot be true? An affirmative answer to this question 
would be misleading. It would suggest that if it cannot 
be true, then it must be false. To see this error, let's 
consider the second main criticism of Searle’s charge, the 
"excluded middle" criticism.
Excluded Middle 
Searle unjustifiably imposes an excluded middle option 
in two ways: First, he assumes that if something cannot be
said then it follows that it cannot be true, and second, 
he says that "since the possibility of its being false is 
not in the offing then it is true (hence, could be true)." 
Let’s consider the first of these mistakes.
Earlier we imagined an objector asking the question, 
"From Wittgenstein’s showing that something cannot be said, 
does it not follow that it cannot be true?" Now, taking 
the words "cannot be true" to be the contradictory of "can 
be true," then if something cannot be true, it must be false. 
But it is not false that I know I am in pain, when I am in
pain. We see once again in a dilemma being forced: either a
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sentence can be true or it cannot be true. Of course the 
real conclusion is that it can be neither true nor false 
that I know I am in pain, when I am in pain. Regardless, 
it would be absurd to think that it follows that if something 
cannot be said, that it cannot be true.
The second way Searle imposes an excluded middle 
option is with this argument: "Since the possibility of its
being false is not in the offing then it is true (hence could 
be true)." The obvious reply to this argument is that per­
haps neither possibility was in the offing, neither of its 
being false nor of its being true. This reply is enough to 
show that the excluded middle is imposed, but does it matter? 
What is wrong with imposing the excluded middle view here?
The error is that to say that a sentence must either be true 
or be false, is to exclude by assumption the very option that 
was at issue. The conclusion of the appeal, as I have argued 
is not that something cannot be true but that it cannot be said. 
Furthermore, I have argued that it does not follow from that 
conclusion that it cannot be true. So, it is exactly this 
"middle" position that is the conclusion of the appeal. To 
exclude this position by assumption is to present an unfair 
attack on the appeal.
Our first conclusion is then, that to charge proponents 
of the appeal to what we would say with the assertion fallacy 
is to misunderstand the use of the appeal. Now, we want to 
confront directly one possible conclusion of the assertion 
fallacy, the conclusion that certain first-person indicative
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assertions could be true. We will see that the primary error 
in this conclusion seems to result from a faulty "shift" 
argument.
Searle*s Charge and The Shift 
Insofar as Searle's charge is designed to make it pos­
sible that certain first-person indicative assertions can be
true, then Searle*s charge is mistaken; for his charge employs 
a "shift" argument that if something can be true of me, then
it can be true (for me to say). I shall argue that it is 
wrong to argue that certain first-person assertions can be 
true (to say). To develop this argument let me once again 
have Wittgenstein present my case first.
Recall Wittgenstein's letter to Moore, the day after 
Moore had read a paper presenting what is now known as Moore's 
paradox. In the letter, Wittgenstein tells Moore that the 
first-person indicative report makes no sense, that it makes 
no sense to say "There is a fire in this room and I don't
believe there is."
It makes sense to say 'let's suppose; p is the case 
and I don't believe p is the case,' whereas it makes 
no sense to assert H p is the case and I don't believe 
that p is the case.6
Wittgenstein observes that it makes sense to suppose, but
not to assert. Now this looks surprisingly like a blocked
shift argument: it makes sense to say (or suppose) of me,
but it makes no sense (for me) to assert.
^Hallett, Companion, page 656.
97
On one reading Moore seems to agree. Moore says 
"We imply by the mere fact of using these sentences that
we are using them in accordance with established usage. . .
And this which we imply is, of course, the contradictory of
what we mean to assert.But this reading of Moore would 
also suggest that Moore accepts the distinction between 
utterance and truth implications. Perhaps Moore means to 
suggest that there is a contradiction between an utterance 
implication and a truth implication. He confirms this in­
terpretation in another source:
To say such a thing as 'I went to the pictures last 
Tuesday, but I don't believe that I did' is a per­
fectly absurd thing to say, although what is asserted 
is something which is perfectly possible logically: 
it is perfectly possible that you did go to the pic­
tures and yet you do not believe that you did.8
Moore suggests that though there is a contradiction between
an utterance and a truth implication, that does not preclude
the "logical possibility" that the sentence is true. In other
words, though queer or absurd to say, the sentence could be
true.
But which sentence? The shifted sentence or the ori­
ginal sentence? The question is not whether the shifted 
sentence can be true; the question is whether the original 
sentence can be true. We have seen that failure of this man­
euver in seeing the failure of the Dretske shift. From the
^Ibid., page 657.
®P. Schilipp, ed. "Reply to My Critics", The Philosophy 
of G. E. Moore, New York, page 543.
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fact that a shifted sentence can be true to say of me, it 
does not follow that I can say the original sentence and 
say something that could be true. The shift argument is 
faulty, so Wittgenstein's observation that it makes no 
sense for me to say (and our earlier conclusion that it 
cannot be said) stands unscathed. It is simply wrong that 
first-person indicative assertion can be true to say.
Our second main conclusion, then, is that the asser­
tion fallacy rests upon the faulty shift argument, and hence 
does not deliver its conclusion. We saw earlier in our first 
main conclusion that Searle's charge of the assertion fallacy 
betrays a misunderstanding of the use of the appeal to what 
we would say. We are now in a position to see also that the 
charge of assertion fallacy provides no ammunition for the 
queer-but-true opponents of the appeal to what we would say.
A Corollary; Inappropriate, Obvious, or Bubble-Like?
Insofar as Searle's charge is directed against the 
appeal to what we would say, it does not apply. But we have 
been avoiding one side of this latest queer but true attack. 
What about the charge that an assertion is queer, inappro­
priate, odd, or some other way aberrant? There are two 
replies.
One reply is that it turns out not to matter how the 
queerness of assertions is described because, as we have seen, 
regardless of how they are described, there are problems with 
the arguments that go with the descriptions. It does not 
matter that Searle has from time to time described certain
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assertions as "too obvious for words," for his arguments that 
accompany that description are faulty. It does not matter
what White, and others, think that some assertions are 
(merely) "inappropriate," for their arguments are faulty.
It would seem irrelevant to dispute the proper way to describe 
the sayings of philosophers. But this reply misses a 
more important option for the opponents of the appeal to what 
we would say. Perhaps what philosophers say is so special—  
unique perhaps— that any attempt to describe in ordinary lan­
guage what they say will be doomed to failure. Indeed when 
attempting such a description Virgil C. Aldrich had to resort 
to the image of soap-bubbles to characterize what philosophers 
do:
John sits at the seminar table and, in the middle of the 
discussion utters the sentence "I'm here now" as he might 
blow a soap bubble to float before them for inspection, 
out of working connections.9
This difficulty, then, if fastening on the right word ("ob­
vious", "inappropriate", "bubble-like") betrays a more diffi­
cult problem: Is it possible that even though philosophers
cannot use words in a normal way, perhaps they use them in a 
special way? Is there a special philosophical use of words?
If so, it would be no surprise that those words cannot 
(normally) be said, nor would it be a surprise that they 
couldn’t quite (normally) be said to be true.
G. E. Moore in his letter to Malcolm suggests one 
half of this picture. He suggests that there is a special
^Virgil C. Aldrich, "Too Obvious for Words," page 356.
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philosophical use, though he denies the other half by de­
claring that even with the special philosophical use, what 
he says can be true. Let's turn now to examine Moore's 
notion of the philosopher's use of words, for it promises 
to reveal something about the nature of philosophical asser­
tions .
CHAPTER V
THE PHILOSOPHER'S USE OF WORDS
G. E. Moore argues for a special philosopher's use
of words. In response to Malcolm, who suggested that
Moore's use was a misuse, Moore argues:
You were wrong in saying that mine was a misuse. . .
In my case I was using them with a purpose— the pur­
pose of disproving a general proposition which many 
philosophers have made.l
In the same letter he makes clear that though he did not
use those words in their ordinary use, still he used them
even in "a useful way." For though he concedes that some
things philosophers say may be queer, in that they are not
used in their ordinary way, still he maintains that they
might be true because used in a special way.
Moore's position also seems to be more enlightened 
than those we have encountered earlier. He seems to under­
stand the use of the appeal to what we would say. He seems 
to concede that, in any ordinary way, what he says has no 
use. He not only hears what he is saying, he seems to face
^Malcolm, Thought and Knowledge, page 174.
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up to it. Nevertheless he does argue that what he says 
could be true.
It will emerge that Moore almost succeeds at present­
ing a paradigm case appeal against other philosophers. Be­
cause he fails to present this appeal properly, he also fails 
to support his thesis. But what Moore says may not be entirely 
mistaken. Indeed, in answer to the central question of this 
Chapter (Can there be a philosopher's use of words?) I shall 
be forced to answer: "I don't really know." The arguments 
given (principally by Malcolm) against Moore are sometimes 
effective but never conclusive. And, Moore's replies have 
the same dual quality. Nevertheless, if one had to choose 
sides, one should choose Malcolm's; for as we shall see, 
the weight of the arguments is on his side. Perhaps we will 
at least glimpse some of the ways not to understand what 
philosophers say. In favor of Moore I shall mention three 
points: that he opposes skepticism, that his opposition is
enlightened, and that he sees that Malcolm's charge of a 
"misuse" of "I know" is not quite accurate. Against Moore,
I shall consider four points : that he misinterprets the
missing ingredient criticism, that he seems to equivocate 
on the word "use", that he asserts the paradigms, and that 
it is not clear what he is doing when he is "responding to 
philosophers." But the last is not Moore's fault, for, 
as I shall suggest, it is not clear what anyone is doing 
when he is responding to philosophers. To develop these 
criticisms it will be helpful first to consider Moore's
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response to the missing-ingredient argument, and, then Mal­
colm's recent view of Moore.
Moore's Response To The Missing Ingredient Argument
Recall that Malcolm enumerated a number of conditions 
that normally accompany the correct employment of the words 
"I know." It was Malcolm's argument against Moore that when 
he and Moore were sitting on a bench directly in front of a 
tree, that since no one of the three conditions was satis­
fied, it was a misuse of "I know" for Moore to say that "I
2know that that's a tree." To take one of the ingredients 
as an example, because the ingredient of "doubt" was missing, 
there was no doubt to be resolved by Moore’s assertion, there 
was no room for its employment; it was a misuse of words.
Moore did not agree with the conclusion of Malcolm's 
missing-ingredient argument. In his letter to Malcolm, Moore 
replied :
You wanted then, and you want now, to say that my use 
of "I know that that's a tree" was a "misuse" & "in­
correct"; but the only reason you give for saying so 
is that I used it under circumstances under which it 
would not ordinarily be used, e.g., under circumstances 
that there neither was at the moment not had been just 
previously any doubt whether it was a tree or not. But 
that I used it under circumstances which it would not 
ordinarily be used is not reason at all for saying I 
misused it or used it incorrectly.3
Moore does not think that the mere absence of one ingredient
(circumstance) for ordinarily saying "I know" his saying
^Malcolm, "Defending Common Sense," page 203.
^Malcolm, Thought and Knowledge, page 174.
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"I know," for as he said earlier, he was not using it in an 
ordinary way.
In fact, Moore attacks Malcolm's argument more directly
by accusing I4alcolm of equivocating on the word "senseless."
Moore charges that when Malcolm criticizes Moore for saying
something which makes no sense that Malcolm fails to notice
a double meaning of the word "senseless".
It seems to me you have been misled into saying this 
latter partly at least through having failed to notice 
an ambiguity in our use of "senseless." If a person, 
under circumstances in which everybody would see quite 
clearly that a certain object was a tree, were to keep 
repeatedly pointing at it and saying "That's a tree" 
or "I know that's a tree," we might well say that that 
was a senseless thing for him to say; and even if he said 
it only once, under such circumstances, we might well 
say that it was a senseless thing for him to do— meaning, 
in all these cases, that it was a sort of thing which a 
sensible person wouldn't do, because, under those cir­cumstances, it would serve no useful purpose to say 
those words...But this is an entirely different thing 
from saying that the words in question don't, on that 
occasion "make sense," if by this is meant something 
which would follow from the proposition that they were 
not being used in their ordinary s e n s e . 4
In Moore's view then, Malcolm mistakes the "senseless" use 
of certain words with those words lacking any sense. Once 
again the appeal to what we would say is under attack, for, 
what Moore is saying amounts to the charge that if a philo­
sopher looks to the ordinary use of certain expressions then 
he is entitled to draw only conclusions about how those words 
are ordinarily used. But for Moore, and of course for many
other philosophers, that almost goes without saying. Surely, 
it is commonplace that philosophers do not always use words
^Thought and Knowledge, page 174.
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in their ordinary acceptation. "But so what," the challenge 
comes from Moore, "We want to know whether what those philoso­
phers say is trueI" In this response to Malcolm, Moore shows 
the strengths of his position: he opposes skpeticism, he is
enlightened about his own position, and he sees that Malcolm's 
charge of a "misuse" is not quite right. I shall ej^lore 
these three strengths later when we turn to criticizing Moore. 
But first we need to take what insights we can from Malcolm’s 
more recent view of Moore, for this view is considerably 
more subtle and more flattering to Moore.
Malcolm's Recent View of Moore
Malcolm begins by stating that that Moore was not 
using words in their ordinary way, that Moore was not talk­
ing nonsense, and that Moore was giving a "philosophical"
5employment to the words "I know." But by conceding these 
three points, Malcolm invites the question what Moore was 
doing with the words he was using. Malcolm tries to develop 
a subtle and, as it turns out, flattering answer: he says
that Moore was expressing both philosophical insights and 
philosophical errors.
Malcolm says that Moore's insight is complex; he says
that "Moore's expression of the form "I know. . contains 
several layers or veins of meaning; which is to say there 
are several different, correct, interpretations of his philo-
T̂hought and Knowledge, page 185.
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gsophical message.” In fact, Malcolm thinks there are four 
such correct interpretations of Moore's message. Let's con­
sider those four; for we shall find that they reveal both 
the strengths and weakness of Moore's attempted response to 
what Moore called "the Skeptical Philosophers."
The first so-called correct interpretation is simply 
to note that Moore was responding to skepticism. Like Austin's 
plain man, Moore was incredulous that anyone would seriously 
doubt the things that some philosophers had claimed to 
doubt. Just as the plain man reacted to the challenge of what 
we know, so Moore reacted to the same kind of challenge. But 
unlike the plain man, Moore asserts the paradigm against the 
skeptic. Whereas the plain man, exasperated, would exclaim 
(if challenged)’: "If that's not seeing a chair I don't know 
what is I", Moore in contrast to the plain man would exclaim :
"I ^  know that that is seeing a chair I"
Now why does Moore think it necessary to assert the 
paradigm? In the second interpretation Malcolm suggests that 
one answer is that Moore saw that as the only option. In 
what Malcolm calls (^d what we have called) the "excluded 
middle" position, Malcolm suggests that Moore saw that the 
words "I do not know that that's a tree" could not be said, 
so he saw as his only option to say "I ^  know that that's 
a tree." There is support for the position that Moore saw 
only two options: when responding on another occasion to
Gibid.
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skepticism he proclaimed that he knew that "here is one hand
and here is another," while holding out his hands. He added
in support of his assertion:
How absurd it would be to suggest that I did not know it, 
but only believed it, and that perhaps after all it was 
not the easel You might as well suggest that I do not 
know that I am now standing up talking— that perhaps after 
all I’m not, and that its not quite certain that I ami7
We shall return to this interpretation of Moore, since, as I
shall argue, it is one of Moore's errors, one of his reasons
for failing to give correctly the paradigm-case appeal to
what we would say.
In the third "correct" interpretation of Moore's insight, 
Malcolm portrays Moore as expressing, albeit not very ex­
plicitly, what Malcolm calls the "introspective" insight.
Malcolm suggests that Moore saw an analogy in saying "I 
know" with saying "I feel ill," and "I feel embarrassed." 
Malcolm claims that when someone says, for example, "I feel 
ill" his assertion has three features that Moore wanted to 
emphasize in saying "I know".
Now when someone says "I feel ill" or "I feel em­
barrassed ," understands the language, and is being 
truthful, his utterance has the following three logi­
cal features: first, it is not subject to error;
second, it is neither supported by nor supportable 
by any investigation, third, it cannot be confirmed 
or disconfirmed by any investigations. My suggestion 
is that when Moore, in critrzxng skepticism, produced 
his illustrations of things he knew he was endowing 
his claims to know those things with these same three 
logical features.8
Ĝ. E. Moore, Philosophical Papers, pages 146-147.
^Malcolm, page 189.
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Now these three features are striking, since they are so 
similar to what we saw in Malcolm's missing ingredient argu­
ment. In that argimient the three features common to our 
ordinary use of "I know" were that there be a doubt or 
question at issue, that the person asserting "I know" be 
able to give a reason for his assertion, and that there be 
an investigation which, if it were carried out, would settle
Ûthe question at issue. There being a doubt or question at 
issue corresponds very roughly with its (not) being subject 
to error. The points about investigation are the same in ' 
both cases. But in the case of "I feel ill" one ingredient 
is missing that was thought to be essential to "I know. . .", 
namely that the person be able to give a reason for saying 
he knew.
Now Moore, in his way, responds to this disanalogy.
He provides his own reason for saying "I know." He says he 
is responding to other philosophers. This need to respond
by saying what he does know is the primary reason Moore fails 
to give a proper paradigm-case appeal. To see this point, 
consider Malcolm's fourth "correct" interpretaion. Malcolm
calls this fourth "correct" interpretation the "richest 
vein of meaning in Moore's attempt to give examples of things 
he knows.^^Malcolm suggests that Moore's "insight" parallels 
Wittgenstein's view in On Certainty;
9Malcolm, "Defending Common Sense," page 193. 
^^Malcolm, Thought and Knowledge, page 193.
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Wittgenstein's perception was that in the class of 
empirical propositions there are some propositions that 
are "unshakeable,” that "stand fast," that are "exempt 
from doubt"; or to state this point differently, 
those propositions are such that ^  they did come into 
doubt one's capacity to make any judgements would be 
destroyed.H
The significance of Moore's asserting "I know that that’s a 
tree" is, then, that not only was he responding to philoso­
phers in such a way as to show that they were wrong, but he 
also wanted to emphasize what was true; some propositions are 
exempt from doubt. I do not mean to discuss whether this is 
a correct interpretation of either Moore or Wittgenstein; 
that is, of whether Moore's insight is correctly described 
by the words "is exempt from doubt." But I should like to 
emphasize that in trying to show so-called skeptical philo­
sophers what was true, Moore has taken a step beyond the 
appeal to what we would say. To develop this more fully, 
let's collect the different criticisms we want to make of 
Moore; and compare them with the points in Moore's favor.
Criticisms of Moore 
In Moore's favor are at least three points. First, 
we have mentioned that Moore opposed skepticism. It is not 
that the very mention of the word "skepticism" should cause 
one to rally against the position, but that it is a primary 
concern of the appeal to what we would say to oppose skept- 
ticism. Thus, insofar as Moore opposes skepticism he is of 
interest to us in our attempt to understand the attacks of
11Ibid.
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some skeptical philosophers on the appeal to what we would 
say. Second, Moore's position is, from the standpoint of 
the appeal to what we would say, more enlightened than, say, 
the position of either Ayer or the Cartesian. In particular, 
Moore saw the use of the appeal to respond or react to philo­
sophers.
The third point in Moore's favor is more difficult to 
make clear. It is easy to state: Moore saw that Malcolm
was not quite accurate in his description of Moore's use of 
"I know" as being a "misuse". But I do not mean to argue this 
point here, for how does one determine a misuse? How many in­
gredients must be missing for it to be a misuse? Or, does 
a misuse have anything to do with_missing ingredients?
These questions, and more, would need to be examined in order 
to make Moore's point that his use of "I know" was not pro­
perly described as a misuse. In essence Moore charges 
that Malcolm misuses the word "misuse." But it is not neces­
sary for us to defend Moore on this point; the further criti­
cism of Moore will not depend on it.
Ifhat are the difficulties with Moore's position? There 
are four principal difficulties: (1) Moore misunderstands
the missing ingredient argument; (2) Moore equivocated on 
the word "use"; (3) Moore wrongly asserts the paradigms and
invites the accompanying problems; and (4) it is not clear 
what Moore is doing when he "responds to philosophers."
Let's consider each of these four criticisms. We will then 
be able to evaluate the success of the philosopher's special
Ill
use of words.
Misunderstands Missing Ingredient Argument Moore does 
not appear to notice that Malcolm, in the missing ingredient 
argument argued that three ingredients were present in all 
cases of saying "I know. . ." Malcolm's accusation against 
Moore was that Moore's use of "I know. . ." had none of the 
three ingredients. Moore responds that it is not fair to call 
his use a misuse since it lacked the (single) ingredient of 
"doubt". Now it is not clear whether Moore thought the other 
missing ingredients were in fact present, whether he thought 
they were missing but their absence was either obvious or 
not noteworthy, or whether he did not see that they were miss­
ing. The significance of this point is that it is entirely 
possible that one ingredient might be missing yet the use 
not quite be called a misuse. To emphasize the point, 
let me note that Malcolm has detailed one dozen different 
uses of "I know. . .," has noted their common ingredients,
and has observed that Moore's use of "I know. . ." possesses
12none of those ingredients. Moore is going to need some strong 
arguments to support his claim that his use of "I know" is 
at all legitimate.
Equivocates on "Use"
This criticism is closely related to the point in 
Moore's favor that Malcolm is not quite right to call Moore's 
use a "misuse." Since I am not developing this theme.
Thought and Knowledge, pages 180-185.
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let me simply point to the equivocation in an analogy and 
suggest that Moore's employment of "use" seems to bear the 
same equivocation. Suppose by analogy, that a carpenter 
retires because of inability to use his hands anymore (per­
haps because of an inj ury). That carpenter might reasonably 
say, "I have no use for my tools anymore." He might even 
offer to give his hammer, say, to a friend, with the comment,
"I have no use for my hammer anymore. I'll bring it to 
you in the morning." Now suppose the night before he is to 
deliver the hammer to his friend, that since his hammer is 
out ready to be delivered, he uses it as a paper weight to keep 
the wind from blowing the stack of newspapers around the 
basement. It would be a poor joke for him to call his friend 
and say "I was wrong, I ^  have a use for my hammer. Sorry.
But I shall not be.delivering it in the morning." I should 
like to suggest that when Moore said he had a use for his 
words, that he was speaking more like the carpenter with the 
paperweight than like the carpenter with the gift to deliver. 
Malcolm however was charging Moore with an improper use in 
the other sense, in the sense of the carpenter with the gift 
to deliver.
Asserts The Paradigm 
Moore seems to feel it is necessary to assert the 
paradigm against his skeptical opponents. Moore says "I 
know that that's a tree" in response to those who say he 
knows no empirical statement to be true. We have seen
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many times that the proper use of paradigm case argument 
is to treat the philosopher wanting to make the assertion, 
not to respond in kind. Moore responds in kind. Of course 
there are the familiar reasons for his doing so: he sees
as his only options either "I do know" or "I do not know," 
and he misses the initial stages of the appeal. But I 
should like to observe, further, that in trying to tell the 
so called skeptical philosophers what was true, he suggests 
that it would be correct to retort that what the skeptical 
philosophers propose cannot be true.
This concedes too much to the skeptical philosopher. 
It is an error to say to Ayer simply that "It cannot be true 
that you do not see that table," or that "It cannot be true 
that you know no empirical propositions with certainty to 
be true." Just as it would be wrong to object to the Car­
tesian opponent "It cannot be true that you know that you 
are in pain." Not only does it concede too much to the 
skeptical philosopher, it leaves Moore no room to develop 
his "special use view," for it leaves him no room to develop 
the thesis that he was using words in this special way to 
respond to philosophers.
Not Clear What Moore Is Doing It seems so simple and 
straightforward: "It was using words to respond to philoso­
phers , so you cannot appraise them according to their 
ordinary use." I have two comments to make on this "simple- 
straightforward" thesis. One, if Moore means to counter the 
"philosophical doubt" with some "ordinary" assurance, then
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I do not see how he can maintain, without further argument, 
that he is using his words with a special philosophical 
employment. But if Moore means to be countering so-called 
philosophical doubt with a thesis of his own of the lack of 
philosophical doubt (that he knows that that's a tree), then 
he escapes this first comment.
Two, since it has not been made clear at all what 
"philosophical doubt" is simply defined as the doubt that philo­
sophers have, it is a phrase in desperate need of a meaning.
As Malcolm observes, "To call a philosophical doubt a doubt 
is as misleading as to call a rhetorical question a question.
If Moore is to make good his thesis that he has a special 
"philosopher's use"of words, he must first establish some 
meaning to the phrase. For, against Moore is the very 
strong thesis that when Moore says "I know that that's a 
tree" he is not using the words "I know" in any ordinary 
way. Outside of a philosophy discussion we could conclude 
that therefore what he purports to do with "I know" is not 
even properly to be called a use.
13«Defending Common Sense," pages 207-208
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Well, can something be queer but true? We can't say 
for sure, though it looks doubtful; but we can say that the 
queer but true attacks are all mistaken. Then are we limited 
to what we say? The question suggests a picture. Now, why 
would someone ask whether we were limited to what we can 
say? What do they think is being excluded? G. E. Moore 
evidently thought he saw something being excluded. But what 
did he see? We really don't know. In fact, we could argue 
that he was himself the victim of a misleading picture.
Where, then, are we with this problem? Let's try to get our 
bearings by briefly rehearsing what has been shown and what 
has not been shown. Perhaps then we can see where we are, 
and where to go from here.
The Central Question
We began by noting a complaint against ordinary language 
philosophy, against the appeal to what we would say; "Of 
course we would not say that, but I want to know whether it 
is true1" Numerous philosophers delivered their challenges 
that an inappropriate, improper, or otherwise queer sentence 
could be true. The central question then was: "Can an in-
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appropriate, improper, or otherwise queer sentence be true?"
The question is significant insofar as it represents 
a challenge to the appeal to what we would say. In itself, 
the question is merely interesting, but in the voice of the 
opponents of the appeal it represents a central complaint 
against ordinary language philosophy.
Now the proper response to a philosophical complaint 
is treatment. We have caused the complainant to hear what he 
says-that it does not fit the initial stages of the appeal 
to face up to his misconstrual of the conclusion of the appeal, 
and to see that on the face of it what he charges is simply 
mistaken. Let's recall what was under attack.
The Appeal To Ifhat We Would Say 
The target of the queer but true attacks was the complex 
appeal to what we would say. Two characteristics dominated 
appeals: (1) They were offered only in reaction or response
to a philosopher, and (2) Their conclusions were only about 
what cannot be said— never about what cannot be true. That 
the proper use of an appeal is in reaction or response is 
shown in the initial stages of offering the appeal. That the 
conclusion is never about what cannot be true is shown both 
by what the proponents say and by the proper use of the 
initial stages of the appeal.
The initial stages are crucial. First, they partly 
determine the kind of appeal, since that is partly determined 
by the kind of statement being opposed. If a universal 
statement (All perception is delusive. No empirical statement
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is certain), then the initial stages eventually culminate 
in getting the philosopher to hear that what he says is, 
on the face of it, plainly false. If the statement is 
singular (I know that that's a tree), then the initial 
stages of the appeal culminate in trying to get the philo­
sopher to hear that what he says is, on the face of it, either 
trivial or not understandable.
The initial stages also combine Wittgenstein’s two- 
staged treatment. First, there is an appeal to what we in 
fact say; then there is an observation (often with an accom­
panying argument) about what can't be said (is a misuse, is 
not understandable, can't be entertained). In the first 
stage, in the appeal to what we would in fact say, the para­
digm is never asserted directly against the philosopher (this 
was Moore's mistake in saying "I ^  know" against "You cannot 
know"); rather it is used to help the philosopher to get his 
bearings, to hear what he is saying. For to assert directly 
would be to show a misunderstanding of the nature of the 
opposing philosopher's statement. Let's now examine those 
who deliver those different queer but true attacks on this 
appeal to what we would say.
Joint Appraisal of Queer But True Attacks
We saw four main kinds of queer but true attacks : 
inappropriate but not illogical (so could be true), the 
shift, the assertion fallacy, and the philosopher's use of 
words. All involve one central error: they misconstrue the
conclusion of the appeal. Furthermore, all attacks but the
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philosopher's use of words involve a misunderstanding of 
the initial stages of the appeal; Moore, to his credit, 
seems to hear and face up to what he says.
All attacks also share one central explanation for 
the errors: they all tin justifiably impose an excluded
middle option White, Dretske, Searle, and Moore all impose 
the forced choice between saying that a sentence can be 
true and saying that it cannot be true. They did not allow 
or did not see, the "middle" option, that some sentences 
might not be correctly characterized either by saying that 
they can be true or by saying that they cannot be true. The 
excluded middle view is also imposed in other places in these 
philosopher's arguments. Indeed, it seems to lie at the 
heart of the explanation of the queer but true attacks on 
the appeal to a what we would say.
Survey of What Has Been Shown 
The primary result is that the appeal to what we would 
say has been defended against four main queer but true attacks. 
It has been shown that all such attacks contain certain errors 
that neutralize or cancel their force. In general, they either 
misconstrue the use of the appeal or its conclusion.
A secondary result is that both the queer but true 
attacks and the appeal have, I hope, been clarified. It should 
be clear by now what is behind the complaint "queer but true". 
It should also be somewhat clearer than before considering 
this topic what a so-called ordinary language philosopher is 
doing when he appeals to what we would say.
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Another secondary result is that one can see the
prominence of important issues in philosophy of logic
behind three related topics : the queer but true attacks,
the defense and criticism of skepticism, and the proper 
understanding of the appeal to what we would say. To take
some examples, first, one can see how a wide or narrow use 
of "illogical" can govern a philosopher's criticism or defense 
of skepticism. Second, one can see how separating the modals 
plays a key role in untangling the web of skepticism. Third, 
one can see how the use and criticism of the so-called 
excluded middle lies at the heart of certain philosophical 
issues. Fourth, one can notice the underlying suggestion 
that the notion of "meaning" i-s not to be treated as simply
one more item in the check-list of qualifications for being 
true or false. The notion appears not to be as separate as 
that would require.
Sxirvey of What Has Not Been Shown
It has not been shown that the appeal to what we would 
say is "correct." Indeed it is not clear what that would
consist in. It has been the goal only to defend the appeal
against one sort of attack, by showing that the attack is mis­
taken in four of its forms.
Furthermore, the possibility of a philosopher's unique use 
of words has not been excluded. It has only been conducted that 
for the moment the possibility is not understandable. This sug­
gests a direction for the future: perhaps the theory of a unique 
use of words provides the only way to understand what philosophers 
say.
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Where Do We Go From Here?
This is not meant to be a presumptuous question.
It is only to suggest what would seem to follow from our 
results. I shall offer four main comments. One, as a means 
of investigation it would appear that it would be profitable 
to investigate analogies between philosophy and other areas.
For example, many lines of poetry would be met with the 
response "That's true", but when examined, these lines 
can be as "queer" as the sayings of some philosophers.
Two, the entire subject of "figures of speech" seems 
relevant. For, many philosophical assertions seem to resemble 
such non-literal discourse. This has four immediate advan­
tages. First, the categories and criteria of criticism are 
already partly developed; second, the results are sure to be 
enlightening given the prevalence of, say, metaphors (planned 
and unnoticed) in philosopher's writings; third, many philo­
sophers writings seem to contain clear examples of catech- 
resis; fourth, a notion such as Wittgenstein's "secondary 
senseseems to possess one trait of many philosphical asser­
tions: they cannot be expressed in any other way without 
destroying their meaning. Perhaps this is why we cannot 
say what philosophers are doing, though they can do it.
Three, the connection between paradigm case appeals 
and Kripke's rigid designator needs to be explored. For example, 
does the missing ingredient argument betoken a so-called
 ̂Philosophical Investigations, page 221.
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"cluster" theory of meaning? Perhaps that is why Malcolm 
wrongly thought Moore's use was a misuse.
Foxnr, why couldn't a computer be programmed to produce 
philosophy? If a computer can be programmed to sort words 
into proper categories, then it can also be programmed to 
mix them up in certain ways. If philosophical statements 
sometimes resemble such mixtures, then couldn't a computer 
be programmed to print out philosophy? Would we still 
wonder whether, though queer, what it "said" was true? It 
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